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THE "NEW" FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
I have given you my Law, and you set up commissions.
Eliot, "The Rock"
THE Federal Trade Commission is a quasi-judicial administrative agency
whose jurisdiction extends to the prevention of all "unfair methods of com-
petition" carried on in interstate commerce and to the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws of the United States.' The judiciary, after initial mistrust, now
generally defers to the Commission's economic "expertise." 2 Yet the FTC
has been criticized for enforcing the antitrust laws overzealously ;3 for not
enforcing the antitrust laws zealously enough;4 and for failing to assist
businessmen to understand and comply with those laws.,
1. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act proscribes all "unfair methods of
competition." 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1952). The phrase-
ology was intentionally set beyond precise definition in order to permit the expansibility
that changing conditions would require. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708
(1948) ; FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931). It gave the FTC "adequate power
to hit at every trade practice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained
competition. .. ." FTC v. Cement Institute, supra at 693. See also United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
The FTC Act was intended to prevent, in their incipiency, methods of doing business
which night restrain trade. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941) ; FTC v. Raladam, supra at 647. It thereby empowers the Commission to prevent
potential violations of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), and
of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952). See FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922). Section 11 of the Clayton Act separately em-
powers the Commission to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7 and 8 of that Act. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 21 (1952). See note 25 infra.
2. E.g., compare FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952), with FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421 (1920). "Congress having now created an organ endued with the skill which
comes of long experience and penetrating study, its conclusions inevitably supersede those
of the courts, which are not similarly endowed." L. Hand, J., in Herzfeld v. FTC, 140
F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1944). But, for an excellent discussion debunking the myth of
administrative "expertise," see Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 471-75
(1954).
3. See, e.g., DI.Am & KAHN, FAR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND EcoNoMICS OF
ANTITRUST PoLIcy 188 (1954) ; Ferguson, Recomnndations From Congress-A Con-
gressional Viewpoint on Current Antitrust Problems, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 62-64, 67 (1953) ;
Simon, The Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1952).
But see Wallace & Douglas, Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade
Commission, 19 U. Cm. L. Rav. 684 (1952).
4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-21 (1951) (Patman Small
Business Committee) ; charges of Senator Patman, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1955, p. 20, col. 3;
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In March 1953, a new Chairman was appointed to the FTC.0 Since that
time, significant shifts in the antitrust outlook of the Commission have become
discernible.7 Some of these shifts had their roots before 1953 ;5 others reflect
more directly the influence of a new majority and a new Chairman. 9 These
shifts in the composition, the outlook and the activities of the Commission
mark the directions of the "new" FTC.
In general, the directions of the "new" FTC promise to bring it more
closely into line with the functions and significance Congress originally en-
visaged for it as an expert, preventive agency.10 The Commission will stress
Jan. 2, 1953, p. 12, col. 6; charges of Senator Kefauver, id., June 13, 1955, p. 33, col. 4;
Feb. 20, 1955, p. 2, col. 4; Jan. 27, 1955, p. 21, col. 1; charges of the International Business
Federation, id., Aug. 30, 1954, p. 22, col. 4; Aug. 31, 1953, p. 23, col. 2; April 29, 1955,
p. 11, col. 2. But see Kintner, The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year
Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1143 (1955).
5. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2627, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950) ; S. Doc. No. 27, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). The orders of the old Commission have been sharply attacked
for their vague generality. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoM,-
MITTEE TO STUDY THE ANITRUST LAWS 167 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN.
Comma. REP.) ; Effective Competition, Report to the Secretary of Commerce by his Busi-
ness Advisory Council 1 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Effective Competition) ; FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 398 (1953) (dissent); FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1952) (dissent).
6. Edward F. Howrey was appointed Chairman of the FTC in March 1953. This
appointment created a Republican majority. See Republicans Reshape FTC, Business
Week, Jan. 5, 1954, p. 53; Softening Up the FTC, The Nation, April 4, 1953, p. 277;
ef. Kintner, supra note 4, at 1147. Chairman Howrey resigned in August 1955, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 1955, p. 8, col. 4, and was succeeded by Commissioner John W. Gwynne.
See Time, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 73. Chairman Howrey's importance as spokesman and archi-
tect of the "new" FTC scarcely can be overestimated. But the fundamental orientation of
the "new" Commission is unlikely to be disturbed so long as a Republican majority
maintains control. See ibid; cf. 2 CCH TRaDE REG. REP. f[ 8506 (1954).
7. See, e.g., Ae'a' Look Coming in Antitrust, Business Week, July 7, 1953, p. 29;
Businesslike Antitrust Policy, Fortune, Nov. 1953, p. 115; United States and Business:
Era of Good Feeling?, U.S. News, July 24, 1953, p. 69. See also Sunderland, Antitrust
Developments During the Past Year, 36 Cm1. BAR RECORD 103 (1954).
8. The use of consensual and educational techniques to prevent antitrust violations,
now strongly stressed by the "new" Commission, see notes 30-61 infra and accompanying
text, was pioneered by "old" Commissions. See Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 915 (1952);
FTC ANN. REP. 77 (1952) ; 16 C.F.R. § 1.3(d) (1949).
9. See, e.g., notes 10-13 infra and accompanying text. One critic has questioned how
a change in basic policy due to a change in political membership squares with the theory
of administrative "expertise." See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 471-75. See also Clark, C.J.,
dissenting in Rosenblum v. FTC, 214 F.2d 338, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1954).
10. See S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1914) ; FTC v. Keppel & Bros.,
291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) ; ATT'Y GEN. Cox. REP. 132.
"In creating the Federal Trade Commission, Congress had two principal ideas in mind:
first, to create a 'body of experts' competent to deal with complex competitive practices
'by reason of information, experience and careful study of business and economic con-
ditions'; and second, to authorize this body of experts to deal with unfair competitive
methods in their incipient stages." FTC ANN. REP. 1 (1954) ; Address by Howrey, Re-
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the use of voluntary rather than adversary procedures to secure compliance
with the antitrust laws."- It will try to reserve its adversary procedures for
"hard-core" violations.12 And in applying the law the Commission will strive
for an "expert" flexibility: per se presumptions will be used sparingly, and the
scope of inquiry into the market effects of competitive practices will tend to be
as wide as the market forces involved.' 3 However, some procedural and many
substantive developments under the "new" FTC warrant sharp criticism or
qualification. In particular, unless the "new" FTC distinguishes more carefully
than it has between the scope of the inquiry and the amount of evidence neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case, it is likely to hamper antitrust enforcement
by establishing a burden of proof substantially greater than that required by
the antitrust laws. 14
valuation of the Commission's Responsibilities, June 18, 1953, at 2; see also Address by
Howrey, A Report of Progress, Aug. 19, 1954, at L
11. See notes 32-47 infra and accompanying text.
12. The "new" FTC will try to reserve its adversary procedures for hard-core vio-
lations of the law, rather than to decide "test" cases of minor economic significance. See
FTC ANN. RF'. 3 (1954); Howrey, Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 5; Howrey,
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary 3 (1955) (mimeograph) ; Howrey, Statement Before the House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Small Business 3 (1,954) (mimeograph). But see the charge
of the National Federation of Independent Business that the FTC is concentrating on in-
significant price discrimination cases while ignoring the more important ones. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1954, p. 22, col. 4.
If by this statement the Commission means that it will try to settle cases involving
unintentional violations of the law whenever it is convinced that respondents will discon-
tinue the challenged p~ractices, its stress on "hard-core" prosecutions seems to be desirable.
If, however, the Commission means that it will shy away from prosecuting prevalent
market practices because they never have been declared illegal in the past, its policy
would conflict with the policy Congress expressed in creating an "expert" agency that is
able to proscribe new forms of anti-competitive practices as they materialize. See notes
1, 10 supra. This Comment interprets the Commission's statements to indicate that cases
will be chosen on the basis of market significance rather than ideological novelty, but not
that only intentional violations of previously-known offenses will be prosecuted. But see
Loescher, Inert Antitrust Administration: Formula Pricing and the Cement Industry, 65
YALE L.J. 1 (1955).
13. See text at notes 66-75 infra; FTC ANN. REP. 2 (1954).
In order to implement this policy, the FTC has revitalized the Bureau of Economics.
See id. at 21-23; Howrey, Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 3; Address by Howrey,
Economic Evidence in Antitrust Cases, June 1954, at 3, 5. "The acquisition of information
is an essential prerequisite to both intelligent regulation and the recommendation of ad-
ditional legislation." MacChesney, Investigatory and Enforcenent Powers of the Federal
Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WAsu. L. REv. 581, 582 (1940) ; see also Stevens, The Federal
Trade Commission's Contribution to Industrial and Economic Analysis: The Work of
the Economic Division, 8 id. at 545, 563-68. The new stress upon gathering economic in-
formation and integrating it with antitrust policy is a welcome sign that the "expert"
agency is anxious to prove its expertise.
14. See pp. 45-81 infra. For a discussion of whether the Commission should be per-
initted to do so, and suggestions as to possible curbs, see pp. 81-85 infra.
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FORMAL PROCEDURE OF THE "NEw" FTC
The FTC operates under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and its own Rules of Practice. 15 Adversary hear-
ings are conducted against named persons charged with specific violations of
the antitrust laws. 1 They are conducted by a Hearing Examiner who exer-
cises powers comparable to those of a trial judge.17 After hearings close the
examiner prepares an initial decision, ruling on all justiciable issues, which
becomes final unless it is seasonably brought for review to the FTC.'8
When the FTC does review an initial decision, it is free to exercise all the
powers it would have exercised if it had heard the case de novo.19 This in-
15. The FTC has thirty-one Rules of Practice, see 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 et seq. (1949), 15
U.S.C. pp. 1626-36 (1952). It must also conform to the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 STAT. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952), and the FTC Act, 38 STAT.
717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).
16. See Rule of Practice 5(a), 16 C.F.R. § 2.5(a) (1949). The proceedings are
generally governed by rule 15, 16 id. § 2.15.
The FTC may institute proceedings entirely on its own initiative, see United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950), or in response to an application by com-
peting businessmen alleging violations of the law. Rule of Practice 4, 16 C.F.R. § 2.4
(1949). About 65% of all cases originate outside the FTC. Freer, Federal Trade Com-
mission, Procedure and Practice, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 316, 317 (1940). The complaining
businessman is not a party to the FTC action, however; the Commission acts "ex parte
and only where substantial public interest is involved." Freer, Practice Before the FTC,
7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 283, 285 (1939); see 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1949). The complaining
businessman may be permitted to intervene on written motion as an "interested person."
See 16 id. § 2.9. It is also possible that he may be permitted to appeal from a decision
adverse to his interests. See notes 296-302 infra and accompanying text.
17. "To assure a proper functioning of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, a
number of steps have been taken to increase the authority of the hearing examiners who,
as triers of fact, are of key importance in the administrative process." Howrey, A Report
of Progress, supra note 10, at 5. He is empowered to regulate the course of the hearings,
to rule on offers of proof, and to take "any other action authorized by Commission rule
consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act." Rule of Practice 14, 16 C.F.R. § 2.14
(1949).
Under new Rule of Practice 10, 16 id. § 2.10, the examiner now may dismiss an FTC
complaint for failure to state a valid cause of action, and for lack of public interest. See
Premier Pillow Co., Docket No. 6136, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 25276 (FTC Dec. 1954) ;
but ef. Florida Citrus Mutual Co., Docket No. 6074, 3 id. f[ 25076 (FTC March 1954).
Interviews with Commissioners and Staff members in March 1955 (hereinafter cited as
INTERVIEWS), indicate that the power and prestige of the examiner will be enhanced still
further until he is able to exercise the function of a trial judge. See also Address by
Howrey, FTC Decisions, April 2, 1954, at 7.
18. The initial decision becomes official after thirty days unless one of the parties
appeals to the Commission or the Commission moves to review the decision on its own
initiative. Rules of Practice 22, 23, 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.22, 2.23 (1949). The "new" FTC will,
whenever possible, adopt the examiner's decisions rather than ignore them and make its
own findings de novo. FTC ANN. RE I. 3 (1954); INTERviws; Howrey, A Report of
Progress, supra note 10, at 4.
19. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) ; Rules
of Practice 22(a), 25(a), 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.22(a), 2.25(a) (1949).
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cludes the power to make original findings of fact.20 If the FTC finds that
respondent violated the law, it issues an order enjoining the illegal practices.
21
Respondent may appeal such an order to the appellate courts.22 FTC counsel
may not appeal an order exonerating the respondent.
23
The FTC could lubricate the channels of enforcement if it phrased Clayton
Act orders under both the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. Orders issued under
section 5 of the FTC Act are immediately operative in their own right ;24
orders issued only under section 11 of the Clayton Act do not become opera-
20. See note 19 supra.
"The power to determine facts is probably as great a power, if not greater, than the
power to interpret the law." Address by Howrey, FTC & The Administrative Process,
Jan. 28, 1954, at 11. "The facts of a case, remember, are not what actually happened but,
at best, what the trial court says it thinks happened." FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 326
(1950). This is especially true in the case of the FTC because of the immense deference
courts pay to its "expertise" in "finding" the "facts." So long as there is evidence in the
record supporting the Commission's findings, the courts do not quarrel with the conclusions
the FTC draws. FTC v. Standard Educational Society, 302 U.S. 112, 117 (1937) ; FTC
v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 73 (1934). See note 2 supra.
21. "Orders of the Federal Trade Commission are not intended to impose criminal
punishment or exact compensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices
in the future. In carrying out this function the Commission is not limited to prohibiting
the illegal practice in the precise form in which it is found to have existed in the past....
it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal. . . ." FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) ; see also FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,
51-52 (1948) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948).
In the past, FTC orders were overly broad. See note 5 supra. Also, the "old" FTC
seldom wrote opinions in cases it lost. Freer, Federal Trade Commission Procedure and
Practice, 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 316, 333 (1940) ; cf. Kintner, supra note 4, at 1152. The
"new" Commission is remedying this situation. "It is important that the business world
know what it may do, as well as what it may not do." Howrey, FTC Decisions, supra
note 17, at 2. "It is my hope that ... future published decisions will not only constitute
the authentic public record of what was done in a particular case but will also afford a
collection of precedents by which its handling of future cases can be forecasted. . . ." FTC
ANN. REP. 3 (1954). Howrey, Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 4. Furthermore,
recent decisions seem far more readable and informative than the formalistic orders of the
"old' FTC.
22. 38 STAT. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1952). However, the courts will not
disturb the Commission remedy unless it has "no reasonable relation to the unlawful prac-
tices found to exist." Siegal v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946) ; see FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
23. "If this Commission wrongs a corporation, the corporation can appeal to the
courts for relief. If this Commission wrongs the public.., there is no appeal by the public
to the courts." Alabama Metal & Lath Co., Docket No. 5449, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
f 11644 (FTC Feb. 1954) (Mead dissenting). See also 2 id. 1 8621 (1954) ; Note, 55
CoLum. L. REv. 561, 565 (1955). But see notes 296-302 infra and accompanying text.
24. 52 STAT. 114 (1938) (Wheeler-Lea Amendment), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1952),
amending 38 STAT. 721 (1914). FTC orders are now "finalized" by the passage of sixty
days, unless they are appealed. Ibid. Thereafter, any violation of the order is, per se,
punishable by civil penalties of $5,000 per day. Ibid; see Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 914
n.21 (1952) ; 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 17215 (1954) ; 16 C.F.R. § 7.5 (1949).
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tive until the FTC obtains a judicial order of enforcement. 25 Any practice
that violates the Clayton Act is also an "unfair method of competition" under
the FTC Act.2 6 However, the "new" FTC is unwilling to accept the advant-
ages of immediate enforceability that are inherent in an FTC Act order; it
seems to feel that its function is to "warn" rather than "punish."2 7 But policy
considerations indicate that all orders should be self-executing to the full limit
of the laws.2 8 This curious preference for the less efficient alternative is
probably the only procedural innovation attributable to the "new" FTC that
warrants adverse comment.
2 9
VOLUNTARY AND INFORMAL PROCEDURES OF THE "NEW" FTC
The "new" Commission will try to get compliance with the antitrust laws
without the use of extended litigation. It will try to avoid litigation by making
25. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952). After issuing an order under § 11,
the FTC must show that a violation of the order has occurred or is imminent before it
can get a judicial order of enforcement. And fines issue against a respondent only if he
violates the court's orders; no penalties are incurred by violating the Commission's order,
as such. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1952); FTC v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951). The respondent is thus entitled to one more
free bite than the common-law dog.
26. E.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1.953)
(Sherman Act or Clayton Act) ; Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
466 (1941) (Sherman Act) ; Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 968, 970-71 (3d
Cir. 1941) (Clayton Act).
27. The FTC can and has achieved immediate enforceability of orders prohibiting
Clayton Act offenses by issuing the orders under both the Clayton Act and the FTC Act.
See Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 47 F.T.C. 378 (1950), aff'd, 344 U.S. 392
(1953) ; Dictograph Products, Inc., Docket No. 5655 (FTC Sept. 1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1954).
However, in Harley Davidson Motor Co., Docket No. 5968, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
if 25108 (FTC June 1954), the "new" FTC expressly chose to find a violation only under
§ 3 of the Clayton Act (although the examiner had found a violation of the Clayton Act
and the FTC Act). The Commission seemed to feel that its function was only to "warn,"
not "penalize." See id. at 35256. INM.VIEws indicate that, short of legislative amend-
ment, the "new" Commission will not bring future actions under § 5 if they will fit under
the more specific proscriptions of the Clayton Act.
28. United States Steel Corp., Docket No. 760, CCH TRADE REG. REP. if 14081 (FTC
Oct. 1948), illustrates the weakness of Clayton Act orders. An order was issued against
respondent in 1924 under the FTC Act, which was then equivalent to the Clayton Act.
Respondent did nothing about it. Only in 1938, when the Wheeler-Lea Amendment put
teeth into FTC orders, see note 24 supra, did respondent bother to appeal.
Legislative amendment of § 11 to square it with § 5 of the FTC Act has been proposed
by Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee. S. 2205, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1955, p. 33, col. 4. Similar legislation
has been proposed by the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, ATr'y GEN. CoMm. REP. 373, and by the "old" FTC, FTC ANN. REP. 3 (1952).
See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 479 (1952).
29. Kintner, supra note 4, at 1.148-52, surveys several other excellent innovations by
which the "new" Commission has streamlined its internal procedures.
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greater use of consent orders and informal stipulations,3" and by establishing
standards that will make it easier for businessmen to stay within the laws.3 '
The use of consent orders to cease and desist has been broadly extended.
3 2
Consent orders may now be issued at any stage of FTC proceedings, and they
may cover only some of the parties and some of the issues.33 Findings of fact
need not be made; respondent may expressly stipulate that consent to the
order does not admit the truth of the charges made.3 4 However, he must
agree that the order will have the same force and effect as if it were entered
after a full hearing.3 5 And he must agree that the complaint may be used
to construe the order.
36
The "new" Commission will also make greater use of informal stipulations
of fact and informal promises to discontinue challenged practices. 3 7 Certainly,
if informal settlements promise to terminate illegal practices as effectively as
formal orders, the costly litigation that may be necessary to obtain a formal
order is not in the public interest.33 The use of settlement procedures is, of
course, wholly discretionary: it is limited to instances in which a respondent
30. See notes 32-40 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 41-61 infra and accompanying text.
32. See FTC Rule of Practice 5(c), 16 C.F.R. § 2.5(c) (Supp. 1954). See also FTC
ANN. RP. 6 (1954) ; Howrey, Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 9.
33. See authorities cited note 32 supra.
34. "Under the new rule, the only admission required of respondents is that of juris-
diction." Howrey, Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 7. See authorities cited note
32 supra.
35. Ibid. Of course, consent orders are enforceable in the courts just as any other
order, even without any findings of fact. See NLRB v. J. L. Hudson Co., 135 F.2d 380
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 740 (1943). And any error of fact that is stated is
"waived by consent to the decree." Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1927);
cf. National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 610 (1939);
Kintner, supra note 4, at 1153.
36. See authorities cited note 32 supra.
37. See Wildroot Co., 49 F.T.C. 1578 (1953) ; Howrey, Revaluation, supra note 10,
at 6. If the FTC is persuaded that it is in the public interest to accept an informal promise
to cease and desist, it can either decide not to issue a formal complaint or withdraw one
that has already been issued. But the stipulation itself is a matter of public record. 16
C.F.R. § 1.3(c) (1949). And it is not a bar to subsequent action if the Commission feels
it was in error: "[I]t is unthinkable that the public interest should be allowed to suffer
as a result of inadvertence or mistake on the part of the Commission or its counsel ......
P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1950) ; cf. Rock v. FTC, 117 F.2d 680
(7th Cir. 1941.).
Of course, the use of stipulations is not new with the "new" Commission. It was also
the policy of the "old" Commission to utilize stipulation procedures to "avoid the need for
adversary proceedings against persons who ... violate the law unintentionally." 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.3(d) (1949). The change is a matter of stress. See the "new" Commission's Wildroot
Co. case, supra.
38. See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936); Eugene
Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321, 330 (7th Cir. 1944); Howrey, Revaluation, supra
note 10, at 6: "If, however, the action of the wrongdoer does not insure cessation, . ..
an order to cease and desist is appropriate."
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affirmatively convinces the Commission that he will not resume the challenged
practices. 30  It is usually unavailable to respondents charged with Sherman
or Clayton Act violations.
40
The FTC is trying to adapt Trade Practice Conference Rules to anti-
trust problems in the hope that it may discourage borderline violations of the
law by making the law clearer to businessmen.41 At semi-formal conferences
FTC counsel help members of an industry to draft Trade Rules which are
oriented to and expressed in the language of the particular industry.42 These
Rules are not substantive law, and they cannot be enforced as if they were;
they are in the nature of advisory opinions.43 But if a businessman wants to
obey the law, the Rules present it to him in the terms of his trade.44 If he
wants to violate the law, the Rules make it easier for the FTC to find that
39. See Consolidated Royal Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1951) ;
Gaiter v. FTC, 186 F.2d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1951). See also FTC statement of policy, 16
C.F.R. § 1.3(d) (1949).
40. "Conspiracies and monopolistic practices are, with few exceptions, deliberately
engaged in ... with knowledge of their illegality. Since good faith is ordinarily lacking
in such violations, it cannot be expected to be present in agreements by the conspirators
to discontinue and not resume the violations." 16 id. § 1.3 (h); see also United States
Steel Corp., Docket No. 6078, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f1 25393 (FTC March 28, 1955).
But see Wildroot Co., 49 F.T.C. 1578, 1581-82 (1953).
41. FTC Rule of Practice 28 provides for Trade Practice Conferences to give business-
men an opportunity "for voluntary participation by industrial groups . .. in the formu-
lation of rules to provide for elimination or prevention of unfair methods of competition
... and other illegal trade practices." 16 C.F.R. § 2.28(a) (1949). For an excellent study
of the Rules under the "old" Commission (primarily directed at advertising aspects), see
Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912 (1953) ; see also Kittelle & Ifostow, A Review of the Trade
Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427 (1940).
42. The FTC may authorize Conferences on its own motion or upon the application
of industry members. Proceedings consist of informal discussions with FTC staff mem-
bers followed by discussions among the industry's members conducted by the FTC. See
16 C.F.R. §§ 2.28(b)-(e), 7.9(c) (1949) ; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 917 (1953). Rules
adopted in the Conferences are codified in the Federal Register, and copies are sent to
each member of the industry. Id. at 921-43. The individual member may then sign and
return the rules if he wishes to abide by them. Ibid. Signing is not compulsory, but failure
to sign will not relieve a businessman from his duty to obey "Group I" Rules, which are
restatements of the law adapted to the particular industry. See Kittelle & Mostow, supra
note 41, at 428. "Group II" Rules merely suggest practices the FTC hopes to encourage.
See Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 925 (1953). Even if the businessman has signed the
rules, he cannot be prosecuted for a violation of Group II Rules.
43. Address by Howrey, Trade Practice Rules and the Cosmetic Industry, May 12,
1954, at 2. See also Kittelle & Mostow, szpra note 41, at 428; Comment, 62 YALE L.J.
912, 935 (1953). However, although the Rules are not given de jure recognition, they
are often equivalent to the law in a given industry and are likely to be valid evidence of
it in FTC proceedings. Ibid. It is also possible that litigants in private suits may be able
to use non-compliance with Group I Rules as evidence of a substantive violation. See id.
at 943-44.
44. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 41, at 435; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 917, 943
(1953).
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out.45 Rules now exist for almost two hundred industries, but their antitrust
provisions are generally platitudinous; they deal primarily with unfair adver-
tising practices.46 In the hands of the "new" FTC, however, they may become
an important means of preventing borderline antitrust violations.
47
An Advisory Committee on Cost Justification has been appointed to study
the difficulties of distributional cost accounting and, if possible, suggest "guid-
ing yardsticks" for the Commission to follow.48 Proof that price differentials
reflect only "due" allowance for differences in the cost of distribution is an
absolute defense to charges of price discrimination. 49 The "old" Commission
was criticized for rejecting cost justifications that seemed consistent with the
highest standards of accuracy of which cost accountants were then capable.Y0
45. One of the major purposes of the Rules is to "ferret out and pinpoint the wilful
violator." Howrey, A Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 7.
46. See 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff1f20018-20227 (1954).
Usually, the Rules were centered upon unfair advertising and the antitrust provisions
were "boiler plate" platitudes echoing the words of the statutes. See Comment, 62 YALE
LJ. 912, 929, 951. n.237 (1953). J. M. Clark has stated that businessmen are unlikely to agree
to anything more restrictive than "innocuous platitudes." Clark, The Laze and Economics
of Basing Points: Appraisal and Proposals, 39 Am. EcoN. REv. 430, 446 (1949). But see
the excellent and widely praised Rules governing the Cosmetics Industry, 16 FED. REG.
1.1993 (1951).
47. Optimistic predictions of success for the Practice Rules have not been fulfilled
in the past. Cf. Ar'y GEN. Comm. REP. 370. And it is possible that businessmen simply
will not adopt rules that significantly hamper some of their activities. See note 46 supra.
However, the atmosphere for successful adaptation is more promising under the "new"
FTC because of its "pro-business" attitude and reputation. Cf. FTC ANN. REP. 52 (1954).
48. See Howrey, The Federal Trade Commission: A Revaluation of Its Responsi-
bilities, 40 A.B.AJ. 113, 115-16 (1954) ; Howrey, A Report of Progress, supra note 10,
at 6.
49. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952), amending 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
The cost justification proviso was designed "to preserve for the consumer and the public
the benefits of more efficient marketing methods, while at the same time protecting small
buyers from 'unearned' discounts which were not related to savings in cost in serving the
large buyer." Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., Docket No. 5728, 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 25197, at 35370 (FTC Oct. 27, 1954) (Howrey concurring).
"Distributional" costs are the costs a seller incurs in order to change the demand
curve for his product. CHAmIBERLII, THEORY OF MONOrOLISTIC CoMPETriTo N 117 (6th el.
1948). They include the costs of advertising, promoting and maintaining a staff to sell the
product. FTC Case Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting For Manufacturing &
Wholesaling, H.R. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941) (hereinafter cited as
FTC Case Studies). It is also possible, but far less common, to justify price differentials
on the grounds of differences in the cost of production. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV.
237, 238-39 (1954). See note 208 infra.
50. Many critics have stated that the cost justification had become illusory. See, e.g.,
Arr'ey GEN. COMM. REP. 171, 172; DIRLAm: & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 123; Rowe,
Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman,
60 YALE L.J. 929, 962-65 (1951). They point to the fact that in the period of almost
twenty years since the Act was passed, only five cost justifications were successful in whole
or in part, and that two of these occurred under the "new" Commission. See Comment,
49 Nw. U.L. Rav. 237 n.2 (1954). Rowe, supra, at 964, went beyond the difficulty of proof
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For distributional cost accounting is in an incubational stage :51 analyses are
long and costly,52 and joint costs are not easily allocated. 3 The accountant
has not established uniform rules of procedure.
54
It may well be doubted that the "old" Commission was really too "tough"
in its standards :5 Robinson-Patman places the burden of justification squarely
upon the seller who discriminates in price. 6 Until satisfactory standards can
be reached, the FTC would not be justified in permitting estimates and aver-
ages to replace carefully documented and logically allocated cost studies.6
7
The "new" Commission will be more sympathetic to cost justifications, 8 but
and argued that prices are related to demand, not to cost, and that the basic standard is in
error. But see CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 104.
51. See ATT'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 173; Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 237, 239 (1954).
52. FTC Case Studies, op. cit. supra note 49, at 21-22. In some reported cases re-
spondents who alleged that they had cost justifications chose to accept cease and desist
orders rather than to undertake the costly analyses necessary to support their allegations.
See Monolith Portland Cement Co., 47 F.T.C. 1292, 1298 (1951) ; Ideal Cement Co., 47
F.T.C. 1030, 1036 (1951).
53. The main difficulty in distributional costing is that the costs are usually incurred
"jointly," i.e., while serving many customers or while dealing with many commodities. It
is necessary to analyze these composite costs, break them into their elements in terms of
fiscal units, and then allocate to each customer the part of the costs attributable to his
purchases. See FTC Case Studies, op. cit. supra note 49, at 2.
54. See note 51 supra. The nature of the problem, see note 53 supra, indicates that it
may be overly optimistic to expect universal rules to fit different situations: sellers' dis-
tributive arrangements are almost always sui generis. See FTC Case Studies, op. cit. supra
note 49, at 16.
55. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237,249 (1954).
INTERviEWs with Arthur E. Lundvall, Chief of the FTC Accounting Division, indicate
that the "old" FTC's "toughness" was more apparent than real. In many instances valid
cost justifications were established by informal conference and never reached litigation.
Only dubious cases were litigated. Under these circumstances, a high mortality rate is
not too surprising. For a businessman should not divide his costs unevenly among his
customers unless he has good reason to do so.
56. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952), amending 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1948) ; Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 989, 992 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951.).
57. Cost differences cannot be established upon aggregates and averages: actual costs
must be shown. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., supra note 56, 87 F. Supp. at
988; Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484, 494-95 (W.D. Ark.
1949). If joint costs are involved, their allocation must be based on a per-unit rather than
per-customer system. Niehoff & Co., Docket No. 5768, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 25467, at
35584 (FTC May 3, 1955) ; cf. FTC Case Studies, op. cit. supra note 49, at 2. And allo-
cation must be based upon detailed analysis rather than lump-sum estimates. See Standard
Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), rev'd o* other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) ; Standard
Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121 (1949), aff'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
58. E.g., in Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., Docket No. 5728, 3 CCH TADE REG.
REP,. f 25181 (FTC Oct. 1, 1954), the FTC permitted a cost justification that was based
on a weighted-average rather than a per-unit basis. Sylvania sold a whole line of electronic
tubes. It charged its retail dealers more per tube than it charged to Philco, which also
bought tubes from it. The price differential varied from tube to tube.
Sylvania showed the actual costs of selling each tube in documented detail. In some
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it will still require documented analyses that make good accounting and anti-
trust sense.59 Therefore, if the Advisory Committee can arrive at workable
standards it would be a major improvement in antitrust law: accountancy would
follow the FTC,60 and the businessman who wished to grant differentials based
on cost savings would have a guide as to how much of a differential he might
safely grant. It would be especially helpful if accounting standards could be
written into each industry's Trade Practice Rules.6 '
Practice Rules and consensual arrangements can eliminate useless litigation
and prevent borderline violations; they should be encouraged.62 But their use
must be buttressed with investigative assurance that compliance habits actually
mesh with compliance promises. The FTC is not sufficiently apprised of
actual compliance with its orders and stipulations to make consensual arrange-
ments truly effectiveY3 However, the Commission is determined to obtain
stricter adherence to its orders than it has in the past, 64 and it has made
instances differences in the cost of selling to Philco did not justify the differences in the
price Philco got; in other instances, however, the differences were more than justified;
and in the aggregate, there was substantial justification. The FTC permitted the justi-
fication in the aggregate because it found that the variations in the differentials among
the types of tubes had no market significance. Demand for any given type of tube did not
depend upon the tube's price; it depended on how fast the tube it was bought to replace
wore out. This decision goes beyond the "old" Commission's costing policies. However,
if it is limited to markets in which the cross-elasticity of demand is negative, it seems to
be a reasonable extension. Of course, the costs themselves must be shown in detail; it is
the justification that may be in the aggregate.
59. The Sylvania case, supra note 58, illustrates the accommodation of accounting
theory to competitive realities. The accommodation must be made if the cost justification
is to serve its purpose of rewarding efficiency but protecting equally efficient but smaller
firms. See ATr'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 173.
60. See Ai'vY GEN. Comm. REP. 173; FTC Case Studies, op. cit. snpra note 49, at 12;
cf. Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237,251 (1954).
61. See FTC Case Stidies, op. cit. suspra note 49, at 12; Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv.
237,250 (1954).
62. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936) ; Eugene Dietzgen
Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321, 330 (7th Cir. 1944). The ATrr'v GEN. CoIm. REP, concluded
that more widespread use of consent orders should "improve vital consent processes," but
it was wary of informal stipulations and Trade Practice Conferences. The Committee
believed that enforcement difficulties made the use of the latter arrangements unsafe. See
id. at 369-72; cf. notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
63. "With respect to most of its orders, the Commission does not now know with
any degree of certainty whether or not the respondents have continued to be in substantial
compliance." Address by Howrey, Compliance With Commission Orders, Sept. 21, 1953,
at 2. There were 4,500 cease and desist orders outstanding when the "new" Commission
took over. Ibid. There was no compliance information for 95% of the stipulations. Id. at
5. See also ATT'y GEN. Comm. REP. 373; H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1951).
64. INTERvIEWs with Commissioners and staff revealed that stricter enforcement of its
orders is one of the keynotes of the "new" Commission. See also FTC ANN. REP. 40,
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substantial progress in reviewing and spot-checking compliance0 5 When the
FTC is in position to be sure that consensual orders are obeyed, their use
should promote more efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws.
SUBSTANTIVE OUTLOOK OF THE "NEw" FTC
The most significant change in antitrust policy introduced by the "new"
Federal Trade Commission is its de-emphasis of per se presumptions of com-
petitive injury in favor of "expert" market analysis. For example, practices
proscribed by the Clayton Act are illegal only if their effect is or may be
substantially to lessen competition. 6 The "new" FTC has stated that it will
examine relevant economic and marketing data in order to determine the
probable effects of practices challenged under the Clayton Act; it will not
41 (1954) ; Kintner, supra note 4, at 1150-51. Voluntary compliance will be stressed, but
"all the compulsory procedures available to the Commission will be promptly applied and
pressed" when there are indications that respondents are violating consensual orders or
promises. Address by Howrey, Voluntary Compliance and Vigorous Enforcenwut, May
1954, at 2; see also Howrey, Complianwe With Commission Orders, supra note 63, at 3.
See note 65 infra.
The Commission has ample power to check on compliance with its orders. Rule of
Practice 26 requires all respondents to file detailed, written reports of compliance within
sixty days after an order is issued against them. 16 C.F.R. § 2.26 (1949). The Commission
may also require from time to time, in its discretion, further written reports of compliance.
16 id. § 2.26(b). The Supreme Court upheld the exercise of the latter power even though
it assumed the FTC was simply going on a "fishing expedition." United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,641-43 (1950).
65. In 1954 the FTC undertook "a broadscale compliance program [including] . . .
a systematic and selective review of over 4,000 cease and desist orders, 8,000 stipulations
and 2,000 trade practice rules." FTC ANN. REP. 5 (1954) ; Howrey, A Report of Progress,
supra note 10, at 6. A special staff committee is studying past orders to see if they are
still adequate under changed conditions; requesting special reports detailing compliance
activities wherever information appears incomplete or outdated; and holding special con-
ferences with respondents whenever compliance reports seem inadequate. The investigative
staff is spot-checking compliance reports. See Howrey, Compliance With Commission
Orders, supra note 63, at 3-4.
INTERVIEWS with PGad B. Morehouse, who is directing this undertaking, indicate
that by March of 1955 the FTC had checked through 1,200 of its outstanding orders. About
750 orders were approved, and supplemental reports were requested in about 450 instances.
Twenty-eight field investigations were commenced to check 'reports against actualities.
And 22 civil penalty suits for non-compliance are either pending or in the drafting stage.
See also Howrey, Statement Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary 3-4 (1955) (mimeograph). The number of penalty suits being prepared
exceeds the total number brought from 1947 to 1953. Id. at 4.
66. See notes 88 (§ 3), 146 (§ 7), and 201 (Robinson-Patman Act) infra and accom-
panying text.
67. See, e.g., Maico Co., Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RP. f 11577 (FTC
Dec. 7, 1953) ; Insto-Gas Corp., Docket No. 5851, 3 id. ff 25188 (FTC Oct. 6, 1954) ;
Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 id. f1 11582 (FTC Dec. 28, 1953) ; General Foods
Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 id. ff 25069 (FTC Apr. 27, 1954). Greater stress upon market
analysis is the most important single change inaugurated by the Republican FTC. The
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rely on per se presumptions of competitive injury.68 It will consider both
structural and behavioral analyses of the markets involved 09 in order to de-
termine whether the effect of the practices is or may be to lessen the "work-
ability" of the competition in those markets.7 The most important indicia of
"workable" or "effective" competition are: 1) ease of entry into the market
for newcomers; 2) consumer and business alternatives, and competitive free-
dom to choose between them: 3) price competition and price flexibility; and
4) the opportunities for growth and survival open to competitors.7 1
Commission is using economic data at several levels: 1) in deciding whether to issue a
complaint, both to evaluate the economic impact of the alleged violation and to judge the
probable effectiveness of a cease and desist order; 2) in investigating the market practices
involved; and 3) in developing an economic as well as a legal "theory of the case" for
litigation. See Address by Howrey, Revaltation of Commission?.s Responsibilities, June
18, 1953, at 4.
68. A "per se" rule is one whereby evidence of a few selective facts conclusively settles
a different, ultimate issue of fact and/or law. Thus, proof of an agreement to fix prices
is, per se, conclusive of an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act; evidence that
fixing the price was "good" or aided competition is irrelevant. See, e.g., United States
v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927).
Chairman Howrey has stated that "the expertise which the Commission is supposed to
exercise plows barren ground if it is bound by absolute or per se rules; that it cannot
acquire a special knowledge of competitive conditions and effects unless it examines all
relevant economic factors. . . ." Howrey, Revaluation of Commission's Responsibilities,
supra note 67, at 2; Address by Howrey, Economic Evidence in Antitrust Cases, June
14, 1954, at 3.
69. Experts differ on the relative importance of structural and behavioral data in
judging the workability of competition. Many stress market performance, i.e., the output,
price flexibility and price sensitivity of an industry. See Mason, The Ctrrent Status of the
Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HAnv. L. REV. 1265 (1949) ; Oppenheim,
Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Micla.
L. Ray. 1139 (1952). Others give approximately equal weight to structure and perform-
ance. See Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly?
63 YAL L.J. 348, 366 (1954) ; Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and
Monopoly, 64 YALE L.J. 1107 (1955) ; cf. Rostow & Sachs, Entry Into the Oil Refining
Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856 (1952). Still others believe
that both are unreliable guides and propose instead the proscription of certain types of
unfair conduct. See DIRLAM & KAHN, Op. cit. sitpia note 3, at 28-43; Kahn, Standards
For Antitrust Policy, 67 HARv. L. REv. 28, 29 (1953). The "new" FTC apparently will
take both structure and performance into account. See Howrey, Revaluation, supra note
67, at 2; ef. note 164 infra.
70. See FTC ANN. RaP. 62 (1954). The atomistic, parimutuel competition of classi-
cal and neo-classical economics exists in very few markets. See note 269 infra. Therefore
many economists and lawyers have insisted that antitrust policy should be re-oriented to
the market realities of "workable" or "unworkable" competition, rather than a chimerical
ideal of perfect competition. But it is not so clear just what the economists' concept of
workable competition is, or how it fits into antitrust policy. See notes 125-30 infra.
71. Most economists and lawyers agree in general that these are the key signs to
workable competition. Almost all lay the heaviest stress upon freedom of entry. See, e.g.,
A're'- GEN. CoMm. REP. 325-30; EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: RELuisIEs OF
A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 186 (1949). The main bars to free entry are 1) the economies
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The Commission's insistence upon market analysis will not preclude the use
of presumptions of competitive injury. However, the presumptions will
have to be based upon market evidence and market analysis.72  Further-
more, the presumptions will be rebuttable: respondents will be permitted to
offer further evidence to show that, in the particular market situation, the
inferences which would normally be drawn are not valid.7 3 Thus the
questions for decision become how much and what sorts of market evidence are
necessary in order to establish or rebut a prima facie case of competitive in-
jury. No glib answer to these questions is possible; the answer will
vary with the factual characteristics of the markets and firms involved.74 The
"new" FTC will proceed on a case-by-case basis, and will not decide "how
much" evidence is necessary until the parties, markets and types of practices
involved have been delineated. 75
The "new" FTC's insistence upon case-by-case market analysis is beyond
reproach. The antitrust laws deal with market problems; they must be con-
strued in terms of market standards and market analysis.76 The FTC should
of scale; 2) the existence of superior, efficient firms; 3) indispensable resources; 4) exclu-
sive franchises and 5) high capital requirements. STIGLER, THE THEORy OF PRICE 222-28
(rev. ed. 1952). The FTC will stress ease of entry. Howrey, Economic Evidence in Anti-
trust Cases, supra note 68, at 6. But see the Spark Plug cases, Docket Nos. 3977, 5620,
5624, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 11467 (FTC July 10, 1953) (finding no likelihood of
competitive injury even though discriminatory prices made entry functionally impossible).
72. See notes 67-70 supra. See also Howrey, The Robinson-Patman Act and a Prima
Fade Case, 37 GEo. L.J. 541, 544-45 (1949).
73. The Commission will allow rebutting evidence because it feels that, as an "expert"
agency, it can and must do so-even if the courts do not. "We believe that the structure
of the Federal Trade Commission was specifically designed to make decisions involving
this type of complex economic problem. To refuse to exercise our talents as an adminis-
trative tribunal in these cases because the courts feel 'ill suited' to weigh all of the relevant
factors, would deprive the country of the very services which we were created to furnish."
Maico Co., Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11577 (FTC Dec. 7, 1953) ; see
also Insto-Gas Corp., Docket No. 5851, 3 id. ff 25188 (FTC Oct. 6, 1954) ; Pillsbury Mills,
Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 id. ff 11582 (FTC Dec. 28, 1953).
74. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., supra note 73; Address by Howrey, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Admnistrative Process, Jan. 28, 1954, at 7. The Commission will
refrain from basing its decisions on "quantitative" standards. See cases cited note 73
supra. Thus quantitative comparisons would have utility, if at all, only when based upon
analogy or upon prior decisions in the same industry. The semantic standard -will remain
the same-a reasonable probability of substantial injury to competition. But what is "rea-
sonable," "probable" or "substantial" will vary with the circumstances. See General Foods
Co., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 25069 (FTC April 13, 1954).
75. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 1.1582
(FTC Dec. 28, 1953).
76. "For the distinction between competition and monopoly turns on power in a
relevant market." ATr'v GEN. Comm. RE'. 44. See also id. at 48; Lockhart & Sacks,
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements
Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 933-41 (1952). The "market"
is the "area of effective competition." It must be described both geographically and in terms
of "patterns of trade which are followed in practice. . . ." Standard Oil Co. v. United
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not recognize a prima facie case of illegality until its counsel have described
the parties, practices and markets involved in terms of market operation. The
markets should be delineated in terms of their competitive significance to the
various parties.7 7 The parties should be delineated in terms of their compara-
tive market power and comparative market shares rather than in dollar and
volume terms alone.7"
However, the FTC should find a prima facie case of competitive injury once
there is enough evidence to make it reasonable to presume in a particular case
that the kind of behavior described, in the kind of market defined, by the kind
of businessman involved, will nornally tend to injure competition. 79 Normal
market consequences should be presumed once the parties, markets and prac-
tices have been sufficiently defined to indicate what would normally follow. 70
Evidence of all possibly relevant economic factors should not be required in
order to establish a prima facie case. 80 If there are special circumstances in
States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949) (popularly referred to as the "Standard Stations"
case). See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 508-18 (1948) ; Indiana
Farmers' Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934).
77. Thus, in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the Supreme
Court examined the market, isolated the factors governing entry into the market, and then
looked to see whether defendant controlled those factors. Id. at 508-18. See Rostow,
Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745, 779 (1949).
Cf. note 102 infra. Thus, in effect, the "market" was defined in terms of ability to foreclose
entry. Furthermore, the strategic importance of a market in reaching the consumer may
often be important in deciding its significance as the "relevant" market. See Revlon
Products Corp., Docket No. 5865, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 25184 (FTC Oct. 1954);
Harley Davidson Motor Co., Docket No. 5768, 3 id. ff 25108 (FTC June 1954).
78. See Barnes, Economic Issues in the Regulation of Acquisitions and Mergers, 14
Omo ST. L.J. 279, 298-99 (1953) ; cf. Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 76, at 941; Schwartz,
Potential Impairment of Competition--The Impact of Standard Oil of California v. United
States on the Standard of Legality under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 19 (1949).
This is the position adopted by the "new" FTC. See cases cited note 67 supra.
79. Evidence delineating parties, practices and markets should be taken as circum-
stantial evidence of the effects that would normally follow. One of the purposes of culti-
vating an agency with empirical "expertise" is to prepare it to determine what will nor-
mally follow from such a market picture. But it should not be necessary to draw the
market picture in minute detail. For the competitive impact clauses of the Clayton Act
were intended to strike down potentially restrictive practices before they could restrain
trade. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) ; H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1950) ; Arr'y GEN. Comm. REP. 117; cf. Lockhart & Sacks, supra note
76, at 938. So long as the prohibited effects may reasonably be presumed from the com-
petitive picture drawn in each case, no more should be required for a prima facie case of
illegality. Cf. Otis Co. v. SEC, 176 F.2d 34, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
80. There are innumerable factors that may be considered in determining probable
effects. Not all of these factors need be presented to establish a prima facie case of prob-
able harm. See ATr'y GEN. Comm. REP. 123-26; Oppenheim, supra note 69, at 1158.
Probably as many of them as possible should be considered before deciding which cases
to investigate or prosecute. See Barnes, supra note 78, at 290. But if counsel supporting
the complaint has brought forward valid evidence indicating a likelihood of harm, respon-
dent should bear the burden of coming forward with other factors tending to contradict
counsel's case. See note 82 infra.
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the relevant market, respondent should be allowed to prove their existence
and effects. 81 But the burden of alleging and proving special circumstances
must fall on the respondent.82 He should be familiar with the marketing
peculiarities of his industry.3  Once relevant rebutting evidence has been in-
troduced, however, the scope of the inquiry should be as wide as the relevance
of the evidence.
8 4
Wider economic inquiry, keyed to a flexible use of the rebuttable presump-
tion, will bring the "new" FTC closer to the legislative purpose of Congress
in creating a specialized, expert Commission. 85 So long as the economic
evidence it considers is relevant, and the amount it requires to establish or
rebut a prima facie case of illegality does not alter the substantive require-
ments of the antitrust law, the Commission should be permitted to determine
the limits of its capacity for expert analysis.80
However, some of its decisions indicate that the "new" FTC is altering
substantive standards which the Supreme Court has established. Developments
in three areas warrant extended comment: 1) exclusive dealing and tying ar-
rangements, under section 3 of the Clayton Act; 2) mergers, under section
7 of the Clayton Act; and 3) territorial price discriminations, under the
Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act.8 7 Analysis of recent cases
81. See note 73 supra.
82. "[T]he proponent of any factual proposition shall be required to sustain the burden
of proof with reference thereto." FTC Rule of Practice 18, 16 C.F.R. § 2.18(a) (1949) ;
see Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1952). Cf.
Oppenheim, supra note 69, at 1159-60; Adams, supra note 69, at 354-55.
83. The jurisdiction of the FTC is enormous and the amount of funds with which it
works is limited. See FTC RE'oRT oN CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuisinoNs 175-80
(hereinafter cited as MERGER REPoRT) ; cf. Dession, The Trial of Economic and Tech-
nological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L.J. 1019, 1242 (1949). The respondent is in a superior
position to know about special circumstances and market peculiarities existing in his line
of trade. The balance of convenience indicates that the burden of introducing detailed
evidence of structural idiosyncracies should therefore lie with respondent. See Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953).
84. FTC counsel should be free to expand the scope of the inquiry, if necessary, to
surrebut respondent's evidence. Thus, more elements would be considered in determining
what is "reasonably probable." See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 76, at 929, 938; Oppen-
heim, supra note 69, at 1158-60.
85. See notes 10, 76 supra. "The courts consistently have recognized that the Com-
mission was created for the purpose of appraising economic data and market facts, and
they have repeatedly declared that the courts are ill-suited to perform such functions."
Howrey, FTC and The Administrative Process, supra note 74, at 8. See FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13, 322 (1949) ; DiRLAm & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 103.
But see Note, 55 COLUm. L. Rav. 561, 564 (1955), which states that the FTC was created
to reach violations that the courts could not or would not reach, and that "it is at least
anomalous that the Commission will sanction activity which the courts find illegal."
86. See notes 290-91 infra and accompanying text.
87. For discussions considering other recent FTC decisions, see Kintuer, supra note
4; Loescher, Inert Antitrust Administration-Formida Pricing and The Cenent Industry,
65 YAL. L.J. 1 (1955) (basing point cases) ; Sunderland, supra note 7.
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in these areas will indicate the extent and nature of the FTC's departures from
established standards of antitrust law and policy. It will also prepare the way
for a fuller discussion of whether the FTC is free to depart from these stand-
ards; and, if it is not, how to reconcile disparities without unduly limiting the
Commission's freedom to apply its "expertise" to the market problems of
particular cases.
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT BY THE "NEW" FTC
Section 3 of the Clayton Act proscribes exclusive dealing and tying arrange-
ments the effect of which is or may be "to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."88 By an exclusive dealing
arrangement, the seller predicates the sale of a desirable product upon the
"condition, agreement or understanding" that the buyer will take all he needs
of that product exclusively from the seller.8 9 By a tying arrangement, the
seller predicates the sale of a desirable product (the "tying" product) upon
the "condition, agreement or understanding" that, the buyer will also buy
another, different product (the "tied" product) from the seller.0°
The Clayton Act does not differentiate between exclusive dealing and tying
arrangements, but the courts have established different standards for the
legality of each.91 Both types of arrangements, by their nature, foreclose the
seller's competitors from access to segments of the market,92 and the Supreme
88. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952). The more important legislative
history of the Clayton Act is cited in Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition--
The Impact of Standard Oil of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality
Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 21 n.40 (1949). See also Lockhart & Sacks,
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements
Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REV. 913, 933-36 (1952).
89. See Note, 49 COLUm. L. REV. 241,242 (1949).
An exclusive dealing arrangement may come within the statute even though there is
not a contract, so long as a condition or understanding is shown. United States v. Rich-
field Oil Co., 99 F. Supp. 280, 294-96 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922
(1952); Carter Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 1940); Lockhart & Sacks,
supra note 88, at 920; ef. Note, An Interstate Circuit Approach to the Refusal to Deal
Dilemma Under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 64 YALE L.J. 581 (1955).
90. See J. L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952, 955 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 776 (1945); Note, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 241, 242 (1949). Tying arrangements
are generally a form of full-line forcing, the tying product being closely related to the use
of the tied. Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 88, at 943; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 389 (1954).
Here too, the agreement need not be overt if there is an understanding. See United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) ; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 389 n.1 (1954).
91. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (exclusive
arrangements), with Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
(tying arrangements). See text accompanying notes 96, 99 infra.
92. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 91, at 314; Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, supra note 91, at 604-05; International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1.947). "Foreclosure" is, in this sense, a term of art meaning
that one businessman's conduct has insulated him, pro tanto, from the necessity of com-
peting with other (existing or potential) businessmen; it does not necessarily mean that
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Court has stated that "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from
any substantial market. ' 93 But tying arrangements are usually forced upon
a buyer by a more dominant seller,94 and they serve hardly any economic
purpose besides foreclosing markets.95 Therefore, in the Times-Picayune case,
the Supreme Court stated that these arrangements are illegal per se if the
seller is "dominant" in the market for the tying product, or if a substantial
amount of commerce is restrained in the market for the product tied. 96 Ex-
clusive arrangements, in contrast, may be "responsive to genuine market
demands," and may aid competition rather than reduce it.9 7 But the Supreme
Court has declined to go into the market problems involved in weighing their
actual, short-term effects upon competition, 98 and in Standard Stations it held
that it was illegal per se for a major seller to use exclusive contracts which
foreclosed competitors from access to a substantial share of the market and
from a substantial volume of business.99
competing businessmen cannot sell their goods. See symposium statements of Judge Stan-
ley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, and Professor Louis B. Schwartz. Hearings
Before the Select Committee o Small Business to Consider the Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep.,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1955) ; Revlon Products Corp., Docket No. 5685, 3 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. 1125184 (FTC Oct. 1954).
93. International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 92, at 396. See also United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
94. See MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 199 (1941); NoRwooD, TRADE PRACTICES &
PRICE LAW c. 14 (1938) ; Note, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 241, 246 (1949) ; cf. Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1.953) ; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note
88, at 942; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 389 (1954). The amount of coercion the seller can bring
to bear will, of course, vary inversely with the substitutes for the tying product that are
commercially available to the buyer.
95. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 94, at 604; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
96. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 596, 606-09 (1953)
(dictum), and cases there cited. Times-Picayune was tried under the Sherman Act
standard, which was held to require a showing of both factors. Ibid. A patent on the
tying product is at least prima facie evidence of dominance. Id. at 608; International Salt
Co. v. United States, supra note 95, at 395-96; NoRwooD, op. cit. supra note 94, at c. 15.
97. Stockhausen, The Commercial and Antitrust Aspects of Term Requirements Con-
tracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 412, 414, 428 (1948). See also A'rry GEN. Coa. REP. 138;
DIRLAMA & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 185, 189; EDWARDS, op. Cit. supra note 71, at
176: Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 88, at 919-20. They may not only be non-coercive, and
mutually beneficial to both parties, but above all they may "fortify the market position
of weaker competitors . . . and enable new entrants to gain a foothold by assuring a set
volume of business for a critical starting period." Avr'y GEN. Comm. REP. 145. See
notes 115-17 infra and accompanying text.
98. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1949). See also United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 343
U.S. 922 (1952) ; Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Dicto-
graph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1954).
99. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
There is a wide difference of opinion as to just what Standard Stations held. The cur-
rent view seems to be that the substantial share of stations which Standard tied up with
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The "new" FTC appears to have accepted the standards of Times-
Picayune,'0° but it has stated that it will not follow Standard Stations.101 It
will presume the likelihood of competitive injury from proof that exclusive
contracts foreclosed a leading seller's competitors from access to a substantial
share of the market. 10 2 But that presumption is not conclusive; it may be
exclusive contracts created the inference of foreclosure of market outlets that, in turn,
created the inference of probable injury. See ATm'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 141-42; Lockhart
& Sacks, supra note 88, at 916, 931. But others have taken the case to mean that the
contracts were illegal because the quantitative volume of sales affected was substantial.
See Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts
to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcE. L. REv. 1139, 1180 (1952). Schwartz,
supra note 88, at 14, thought the case turned on substantial volume, but only when the
contracts were used by a market leader. This interpretation also seems quite tenable.
The difficulty arises because the Standard Stations case mentioned a number of factors
bearing on competitive effect without ever specifying which, if any, was the significant
one. It pointed out that Standard was not "dominant," Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
supra at 302, but it was the leading seller in a saturated market area, selling 23% of the
gallonage in the market. Id. at 293-95. And although it stated that the percentage of
market shares involved (16% of the independent gas stations) was the most important
factor, id. at 295, 308, it also seemed to peg the potentiality of harm directly on the sub-
stantial number of stations affected. Id. at 311.
However, one thing is clear. Whatever the factors upon which the case turned, the
Court was convinced that when those factors were present that was the end of the case.
Id. at 309, 310. The Court recognized that evidence of lowered costs, reasonable length,
etc., might be pertinent to the contracts' short-run effect, id. at 306, 308, but it thought
that their probable long-run effect of barring entry and diminishing competition out-
weighed short-run economic justification. Id. at 308, 309. And it thought evidence of
flourishing competition was inconclusive and immaterial. Id. at 310-14. It is possible to
argue that this exclusion was based upon statutory construction, id. at 308-09, or upon
the Court's inability and unwillingness to become embroiled in complex economic prob-
lems, id. at 310 n.13. But whatever its rationale, the Court did hold that the presence of
the critical factors created a conclusive presumption of injury.
100. Insto-Gas Corp., Docket No. 5851, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RE'. f1 25188 (FTC Oct.
6, 1954). See notes 131-45 infra and accompanying text.
101. "From our reading of the statute, we cannot conclude that evidence of the effect
... is immaterial .... The Supreme Court did not require evidence of competitive effect
under the circumstances of the Standard Stations case, ruling that it was sufficient to
show that competition had been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce
affected. In its decision, it stated that courts were most ill-suited to make an appraisal
of economic data to determine the actual effect....
"It is significant that at the same time the Court pointed out the Federal Trade Com-
mission was adequately equipped to weigh all relevant economic factors." Maico Co.,
Docket No. 5822. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 11577 (FTC Dec. 7, 1953).
102. See Anchor Serum Co., Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RE'. 11634
(FTC Feb. 1954) ; Harley Davidson Motor Co., Docket No. 5768, 3 id. 11 25108 (FTC
June 1954) ; Revlon Products Corp., Docket No. 5685, 3 id. f1 25184 (FTC Oct. 1954).
In Revlon, respondent had argued that its sales under exclusive contracts were not sub-
stantial in terms of the national market for cosmetics. The FTC held, however, that the
purpose of considering the volume of sales was to determine whether their use was likely
to lessen competition. And the Commission found a substantial likelihood of injury not
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rebutted by further proof that the foreclosures did not in fact, and do not
tend, substantially to lessen competition.
1 3
Exclusive Dealing Contracts
In the Maico case the "new" FTC held that, unlike the courts, it would
consider rebutting market evidence offered by respondent to show the "actual
effect" of exclusive dealing contracts.'" Maico, one of the nation's six largest
hearing aid manufacturers, established 123 exclusive retail outlets between
1945 and 1950. 15 The hearing examiner, relying on Standard Stations, held
that Maico's size, its rapid growth, and the large number of dealerships it had
established made its use of exclusive contracts illegal. 10 6 Therefore he refused
to permit Maico to introduce evidence that the number of dealers with whom
it had exclusive contracts constituted only a small percentage of the hearing
aid dealers in the nation, and that the number of its competitors and the
volume of their business was increasing while its own market share was on
the decline.'07 On appeal the FTC apparently held that a prima facie case of
illegality had been established, but it remanded the order to cease and desist
because it thought the excluded evidence had a "very real bearing" on the
in the amount of sales but in the market importance of the share of dealers Revlon, a
market leader, had under contract: 176 of 1,100 first-class beauty shop jobbers. Id. at
p. 35331.
103. See Maico Co., Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11577 (FTC Dec.
1953) ; Beltone Hearing Aid Co., Docket No. 5825, 3 id. 11657 (FTC March 1954) ;
Outboard Marine Co., Docket No. 5882, 3 id. ff 11657 (FTC March 1954); Howrey, A
Report of Progress, supra note 10, at 2; Note, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 561, 563 (1955). See
also notes 104-09 infra and accompanying text.
104. Maico Co., supra note 103.
105. Ibid.
Actually, Maico had 123 franchised dealers and 58 sub-distributors, giving it 181 ex-
clusive retail outlets. See Maico Co., Initial Decision, Docket No. 5822, at 3. There are
only 1,000 "established, responsible" hearing aid dealers in the nation. See Dictograph
Products, Inc., Docket No. 5655, 3 CCH TRAnE REG. REP. 1 11526, at p. 12505 (FTC
Sept. 1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954). In return for exclusive dealing, Maico
gave its retailers exclusive territorial franchises. Maico Co., Initial Decision, at 3. It
enforced its exclusive contracts by cancelling some franchises when dealers refused to
comply. See id. at 4-5; Commission Exhibits 20, 21, in the Mfaico Record.
Maico is either the fourth, fifth or sixth largest hearing aid manufacturer in the nation,
although no evidence of market shares was introduced to establish its rank, which was
based on the word of one of its executives. See Maico Co., Initial Decision, at 2;
Respondent's Appellate Brief at 8; Record at 56. Its sales, however, reached almost $2
million annually from 1947-1949, triple the volume it sold in 1945 when it inaugurated the
exclusive contracts. Maico Co., Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 11577 (FTC
Dec. 7, 1953).
106. See ibid; Initial Decision at 5.
107. Ibid. Respondent's Appellate Brief had argued that:
1) Respondent had brought each of its dealers into the market, so that there
could be no foreclosure. Id. at 9.
2) The exclusive territorial contracts it gave its dealers precluded it from selling
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question of competitive injury. 08 It stated that the conclusive presumption
of Standard Stations was not intended to restrict the scope of inquiry permitted
to an expert agency.'0 9
In most respects, the FTC's remand seems consistent with better antitrust
policy. During their term, exclusive dealing contracts necessarily foreclose a
seller's competitors from access to market outlets." 0 If a seller enters into
exclusive contracts with a substantial share of the buyers in the market, that
will ordinarily tend substantially to lessen competition between him and his
competitors."' Thus, it should be illegal prima facie.1 2 It ordinarily puts the
seller's competitors at a disadvantage pro tanto and precludes the buyer from
exercising free market choice; it ordinarily impedes entry by new firms and
clogs opportunities for small firms to expand. 1 3 But it need not.114 Exclusive
to others in that market, so that it could not block entry or establish a monopoly.
Id. at 28-30.
3) The dealers constituted only a small percentage of all hearing aid dealers.
Id. at 12.
4) Its sales and market share had declined in the past three years. Id. at 7, 13.
See Maico Record, p. 202-06 (evidence proffered but not received); id. at 150-51
(evidence stricken) ; id. at 196-97 (proffered).
108. Maico Co., Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. t 11577 (FTC Dec. 7,
1953). The FTC was not explicit on the establishment of a prima facie case, but the
remanding order accompanying the decision denied respondent's request that the proceed-
ings be dismissed. And Maico's subsequent consent to a cease and desist order when it
was unable to produce sufficient evidence for rebuttal purposes further indicates the text's
proposition. See Consent Order, Docket No. 5822, 3 CCH TRADE REa. REP. ff 25475
(FTC June 3, 1955).
109. See note 101 supra.
110. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); A'r'y GEN.
Comm. REP. 138; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 88, at 922.
111. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309, 314 (1949); United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 284-86 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiant,
343 U.S. 922 (1952) ; Dictograph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954) ;
ATr'Y GEN. Cosm-. REP. 41-42. If the seller is the leader in the relevant line of commerce,
that would probably be sufficient in itself. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922) ; Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman
and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 317 (1954) ; Schwartz, supra note 88, at 28.
112. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
113. If a substantial share of the buyers in the market are bound by contract not to
purchase from competing sellers, the seller is immunized from competition pro tanto, and
the buyers are not free to change to superior or less expensive products. This would tend
to create an undesirable price rigidity, varying directly with the length of the contract
and the ability of the seller to enforce it. And as the share of buyers increases, whether
under contract to one seller or to a group of leading sellers, it becomes more and more
difficult for smaller competitors, who are unable to finance their own outlets, to reach the
buying public. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949) ; EDwARDs,
op. cit. supra note 71, at 175 et seq.; Revlon Products Corp., Docket No. 5685, 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP ff 25184 (FTC Oct. 5, 1954).
114. "[Tlhe desirability of any exclusive dealing or use arrangement in the light of
the national policy to preserve competition cannot be decided merely by reference to the
quantity or share of commerce affected." Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 88, at 919. See
id. at 923-28 for a listing of other considerations the authors deem relevant to the ques-
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contracts may reflect market savings to buyers as well as sellers; they do not
necessarily indicate use of monopolistic leverage by the seller.115 If they are
responsive to the technological needs of an industry, and are entered into for
only a limited period, they may not tend seriously to lessen competition in
that industry."" Moreover, when used by a small firm attempting to break
into, or expand its position within, a relatively non-competitive industry, these
contracts may even tend to increase competition."'7 Therefore, rebutting
evidence that particular contracts were not forced upon unwilling buyers and
are not likely to lessen competition should not be excluded.118 The types of
evidence admitted should be limited; the risk of non-persuasion should lie with
the seller; but the opportunity for rebuttal should not be foreclosed. 119
The evidence Maico sought to introduce to show that its dealers constituted
only a small percentage of the dealers in the nation certainly should not
have been excluded. The inference of a "substantial" lessening of competition
is drawn from a showing that access to a "substantial" share of the dealers
in the market was foreclosed. 120 In this context "substantial" is not necessarily
synonymous with "sizable"; it means "substantial enough" to permit certain
tion of injury. See also ATr'y GEN. Commx. REP'. 138, 144; DIRLAmx & KAHN, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 185, 189; EDWA1Ws, op. cit. supra note 71 at 176; Stockhausen, supra note 97,
at 414,424,428. See note 97 supra.
115. See authorities cited notes 97, 114 supra. The fact that the buyer sought the
exclusive contract, and was not a victim of coercion, is irrelevant if there is a likelihood
of competitive injury. Anchor Serum Co., Docket No. 5965, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REI'.
ir 11634 (FTC Feb. 1954), aff'd, 217 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1954). However, coercion
by a leading seller is one of the "badges" of probable injury to competition. See FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 n.3 (1953); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850, 857, 859, 886 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 293,
309 (1949) ; Kahn, supra note 111, at 317-18.
116. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953) ; United
States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949) ; cf. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949). Although there is bound to be some potential
lessening of competition, the practicalities of business intercourse should be given weight
so long as there is no substantial impediment barring new firms from coming in and
stirring up new methods of business. See Avr'v GEN. CoIm. REP. 144, 146; DiRLAm &
KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 113, 119; Kahn, supra note 111, at 316-17; Lockhart &
Sacks, supra noteaBS, at 921; Stockhausen, supra note 97, at 421.
117. AT'ry GEN. Coam. REP. 145; DmuLA- & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 117-19.
Congress did not intend to proscribe the use of exclusive contracts by new or small firms.
See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 88, at 931-36.
1.18. Avr'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 138-44; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 88, at 919.
119. See notes 73, 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
120. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 308 (1949) ; ATT'Y GEN.
Comm. REP. 141-42; DIaAXi & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 117. See notes 92, 110-13
supra and accompanying text.
The foreclosure need not be complete so long as a large share of the better outlets
are closed. See Revlon Products Corp., Docket No. 5685, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 25184
(FTC Oct. 7, 1954). Moreover, if exclusive contracts are used by a seller's competitors
also, it may be sufficient that a substantial share of the market's outlets are foreclosed in
the aggregate. See id. at p. 35332; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra at 295,
309; FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 393 (1953).
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inferences to be drawn.' 2 1 A given percentage may be "substantial" in one
market and "insubstantial" in another because of the size of the industry, the
size and standing of the firms within it, and the costs and incentives of entry. 122
And if counsel has restricted the definition of the market to a limited line of
commerce or a limited geographical region, respondent might show that the
limitations were not competitively realistic.' 2 3 In a re-defined market the
same absolute number would constitute a different percentage, which might
or might not be "substantial." Respondents should be held to a strict burden
of proof, but they should always be permitted to show that the number of
outlets foreclosed was not "substantial" in terms of numbers, percentages,
markets or market significance-in terms of reasonable probabilities of lessen-
ing competition. 124
However, proof of "workable" competition should not constitute a valid
rebuttal to a prima facie case.12  The evidence Maico offered in order to prove
that its competitors were gaining on it notwithstanding its use of exclusive
121. See AT'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 123-26; Effective Competition, supra note 5, at 12;
Barnes, Economic Issues in. the Regulation of Acquisitions and Mergers, 14 OHro ST. L.J.
279, 296 (1953). This may lead to a new Rule of Reason to be used in deciding whether
Clayton Act offenses "may" lessen competition. See Kahn, supra note 111, at 313, 316-17.
So long as the burden of persuasion and introduction is on respondent, and the rule is
directed towards determining whether practices tend to lessen competition, rather than
whether competition itself is desirable, such a rule would be proper. Cf. Stocking, The
Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and Monopoly, 64 YALE L.J. 1107, 1159-60 (1955).
122. A percentage figure of, perhaps, 1%, will always be de mininims; and one of 20%
or more, probably, should always be substantial. See Statement of Professor Walter
Adams, Hearings, supra note 92, at 55. However, these cases seldom arise. And in the
gray area between, one must know the structure and practices of the industry before being
able to determine when a percentage is significant. See Barnes, supra note 121, at 295-96;
AT'y GEN. Comm. REP. 147; hotes 120-22 supra and accompanying text. Thus, although
the "progressiveness" of an industry seems entirely irrelevant to the inquiry, see notes
125-30 infra and accompanying text, evidence that entry is difficult at the dealer level
would make a percentage figure more "substantial" than if entry were easy. For in the
former instance foreclosure becomes even more significant: competitors are not only pre-
cluded from doing business with buyers currently under exclusive contracts, they are also
dissuaded from establishing new outlets of their own. Thus they may be effectively fore-
closed from the consumers' market also. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
123. Respondent should be able to introduce evidence of "patterns of trade," including
evidence of substitute products, which would call for a broader definition of the market.
See AT'rY GEN. COMM. REP. 46; Barnes, supra note 121, at 296; Stockhausen, supra note
97, at 428. Of course, he would have to prove the substitute products were "actually
competitive." A-rr'y GEN. COMM. REP. 46. The courts, adopting the economists' jargon,
have required a showing of a high "cross-elasticity of demand." See Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953) ; cf. United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 196-97 (D. Del. 1953).
124. See Effective Competition, supra note 5, at 12, 14.
125. The concept of workable or effective competition "does not provide a standard
of legality under any of the antitrust laws." ATr'y GEN. Comm. REP. 316. See also
DIeAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15; Kahn, Standards For Antitrust Policy, 67
HARv. L. Rav. 28, 41 (1953). For, as Carlston put it, "We desire a workable antitrust
law as well as workable competition." Carlston, Antitrust Policy: A Problem in State-
craft, 60 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1951).
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contracts should have been excluded. The workability of competition is at
best a nebulous concept. 126 And workable competition is a norm, not a goal:
the goal of the antitrust laws is more-workable competition. 2 7 If competition
in a market is not workable, competitive injury is more likely to follow from
questionable practices. 2 s But once a likelihood of injury is shown, the fact
that an exclusive dealer was unsuccessful in eliminating his competitors (or
even gaining on them) 129 would seem to be entirely irrelevant.
3 0
Tying Arrangements
In Insto-Gas Corp. the FTC remanded an initial cease and desist order
because the record failed to give "comparative market data" from which a
likelihood of substantial competitive injury might be inferred.131 Insto-Gas, a
firm with aggregate annual sales of $800,000, competes with other firms in
the distribution of propane gas, metal cylinders containing propane gas, and
other appliances used with them.132 It leases its cylinders only to dealers who
contract to refill them with Insto-Gas and to use its appliances. 13 3 Its business
is nationwide, although confined to a limited line of propane gas products.
3 4
No evidence of market shares was introduced.1
3
5
126. Mason has aptly stated that "there are as many definitions of 'effective' or 'work-
able' competition as there are 'effective' or 'workable' economists." Mason, The New
Competition, 43 YALE REV. 37, 48 (1953). See the conflicting viewpoints as to the mean-
ing of "workable" competition cited and analyzed in Loevinger, Antitrust and The New
Economics, 37 MINN. L. REv. 505, 528-38 (1953); Markham, An Alternative Approach to
the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 Am. EcoN. REV. 349 (1950) ; Stocking, supra
note 121, at 1107-10. See notes 69-71 snpra.
127. ATr'y GEN. Comam. REP. 316; cf. DIRmAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3-16;
Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly?, 63 YALE
L.J. 348, 366 (1954) ; Kahn, supra note 111, at 294, 295.
128. DIRLAm & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 38; cf. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket
No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 11582 (FTC Dec. 28, 1953); Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., Docket No. 5968, 3 id. IT 25108 (FTC July 7, 1954).
129. See note 107 supra.
130. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850, 863-64 (S.D. Cal. 1948),
aff'd, 337 U.S. 293, 308-10 (1949); Revlon Products Corp., Docket No. 5685, 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ff 25249 (FTC Nov. 22, 1954) (denying motion to reopen).
131. Docket No. 5851, 3 CCH TRADE REGo. REP. ff 25188 (FTC Oct. 21, 1954).
132. Insto-Gas sells two to three million pounds of propane gas annually, either
directly to the user or through 200 dealers with whom it has entered tying contracts. Id.
at p. 35388; see Insto-Gas Corp., Initial Decision at 3; Insto-Gas Record at 232, 244.
133. Insto-Gas has 80,000 cylinders outstanding on 11,000 separate leases. Initial
Decision at 3; Record at 230, 243. Instead of refilling the cylinders (the "tying" product)
when they become empty, dealers take the empty cylinder and give the user another
cylinder, already filled with Insto-Gas, Initial Decision at 4.
134. Insto-Gas Corp., Docket No. 5851, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. IT 25188, at 35388
(FTC Oct. 21, 1954). Propane gas is used for a number of purposes other than torching.
Respondent asserted that its sales represented only 0.03% of the national sales of propane.
Id. at p. 35340. But the FTC felt unable to decide whether this contention was even
"relevant," because "the record does not clearly reveal in just what line of commerce
competition is allegedly restrained." Ibid. Cf. note 122 supra.
135. "There is nothing to indicate respondent's relative size in the industry and no
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The FTC stated that it would have to apply "legal doctrine to a factual
vacuum" to proscribe the tying contracts on this record.'3 6 Counsel had failed
to define the market for the tied or tying product, and had failed to show
what part of Insto-Gas' $800,000 sales was attributable to the tying con-
tracts.137 The total sales, given in terms of market fractions, would have been
significant if they had shown that the seller was "dominant" in the tying
market; the volume of sales under the contracts would have been significant
if it had indicated the restraint of a substantial amount of commerce in the
market for the product tied.138 For the FTC expressly adopted the Times-
Picayune standard: that tying contracts were illegal whenever the seller is
dominant in the tying market or there is a likelihood of substantial restraint in
the market tied.'39 But the dominance or substantial restraint must be demon-
strated, rather than assumed.' 40 And both "dominance" and "substantial" must
be defined in terms of a relevant market.'
41
However, the "new" FTC should not equate the "dominance" necessary to
illegalize the use of tying contracts under section 3 of the Clayton Act, with
the "dominance" necessary to find monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act.'- For the Clayton Act was aimed at eliminating injury to
competition in its incipient stage.143 The essence of the illegality of a tying
contract is the wielding of market power to foreclose competitors from access
to market outlets. 4 4 If a seller has enough market control to force a sizeable
number of the dealers in the market to enter tying contracts with him, he
should be deemed prima facie to have shown sufficient "dominance" to justify
a cease and desist order.
14
5
information concerning the number, or competitive standing, of competitors." Insto-Gas
Corp., supra note 134, at p. 35399.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. See notes 94-96 supra.
139. Insto-Gas Corp., Docket No. 5851, 3 CCH TRADE REG. Rap. ff 25188, at 35399
(FTC Oct. 21, 1954).
140. Ibid.
141. See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
142. See NoRwooD, op. cit. supra note 94, at 113; MiLLER, op. cit. supra note 94, at
199; Note, 49 COLUt. L. REv. 241, 246 (1949). But see Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-12 (1953). Of course, Times-Picayune was tried
under the Sherman Act rather than the Clayton Act, and that may have had some in-
fluence upon the tests of dominance the Court used. See id. at 609. At any rate, the Court
held that 40% of the market was not sufficient to constitute dominance. Id. at 611-12.
And its method of arriving at the figure of 40% warrants sharp criticism. See Kahn,
supra note 1.11, at 326; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 389, 390-91 (1954).
143. See legislative history cited in Schwartz, supra note 88, at 21 n.40; Times-Pica-
yune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 (1953) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311-13 (1949).
144. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953);
Insto-Gas Corp., Docket No. 5851, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25188, at 35339 (FTC Oct.
21,1954) ; A-r'y GEN. Comm. REP. 144.
145. See authorities cited in note 142 supra.
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ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT BY THE "NEw" FTC
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that "no corporation engaged in
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or ... assets of another corporation ... where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.' 146 Recently there has
been a widespread wave of mergers and a trend towards agglomerate com-
mercial growth.147 In the light of this trend, the merger is probably the
greatest contemporary threat to the ideal of a competitive market. For the
acquiring firm usually eliminates competitors as it expands its own facilities. 148
In 1950 Congress amended section 7 to assure a maverick judiciary that
mergers tending to reduce the vigor of competition in any market should be
restrained before they actually did reduce competition. 149 But the justice De-
146. 64 STAT. 1125 (1950) (Celler Anti-Merger Act), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952), amend-
ing 38 STAT. 731 (1914).
The "line of commerce" involved need not constitute a major portion of the business
of either the acquiring or the acquired company. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1950) (hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1775) ; MERGER REPORT 166. Furthermore, acquisi-
tion of part of the stock or assets of a firm is sufficient. Id. at 151; see Hamilton Watch
Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233
(1953). Furthermore, the Act probably covers the acquisition of patents. See Barnes,
Economic Issues in the Regulation of Acquisitions & Mergers, 14 OHio ST. L.J. 279,
291 (1953). And since there is virtually no difference between a merger and a long-term
lease of assets, cf. Note, 64 YALE L.J. 282, 289 n.48 (1954), the Act should also apply to
leasing arrangements, including purchase of an existing lease. Cf. MERGER REPORT 57.
147. Commercial mergers and acquisitions are three times as numerous today as they
were in 1948. MERGER REPORT cc. 2, 3, summarized in FTC Shows Its Scorecard, Business
Week, May 21, 1955, p. 33. There were 1,773 mergers in the fields of manufacturing and
mining between 1948 and 1954. MERGER REPORT 23. The impressive fact is that 45% of
these mergers involved a firm with assets already exceeding $10 million. Id. at 31. In
the aggregate these firms accounted for 65.5% of the merger wave. Id. at 23. Firms with
assets of $1 million or less accounted for only 8% of the mergers. Ibid.
Five reasons were generally given for the mergers: 1) to increase capacity to serve
presently-supplied markets (40%) ; 2) to increase capacity to serve new markets (10%) ;
3) to diversify the line of products (25%) ; 4) to assure supplies by backward vertical
integration (12.5%) ; 5) to assure market outlets by forward vertical integration (10%).
Id. at 50-52.
148. "Every acquisition of existing hitherto independently owned and managed prop-
erties results in the elimination of any direct competition which may have existed between
the parties, as well as forestalls any potential competition which might -have developed
later between the two had the acquirer constructed his own new facilities." MERGER RE-
PORT 131. Thus, the effect of the merger is not simply an expansion of the acquiring firm's
facilities. "If he builds he creates additional capacity and competition; if he buys he reaps
not only the advantage of increasing his capacity but acquires the market previously served
by a competitor." Howrey, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 8 (1955) (mimeograph). See MERGER
REPORT 111.
149. Old § 7 was "emasculated by an unsympathetic judiciary." Note, 63 YALE L.J.
233 (1953). Narrow judicial interpretation had created a Sherman Act standard of
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partment and the Commission have not been quick to use the teeth Congress
put in the amended merger law. 50
In Pillsbury Mills, Inc., the "new" FTC issued a carefully written opinion
that was clearly intended to be a "guidepost" to future anti-merger policy.' 0 '
Pillsbury was the nation's second largest miller of flour products.0 2 It
achieved its ranking position largely by acquiring other firms. 1 3 In 1951 it
acquired Ballard & Ballard, and in 1952 it acquired Duff Baking Mix. 1 4 Both
firms were in substantial competition with Pillsbury in the Southeast urban
market, 0 5 and the acquisitions fortified Pillsbury's already strong position in
illegality for Clayton Act mergers. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37 (3d
Cir. 1933), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934).
Congress passed the Celler Anti-Merger Act, 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1952), to make it clear that § 7 was "not intended to revert to the Sherman Act test.
The intent here, as in other parts of the Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic ten-
dencies in their incipiency .. " S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 146, at 4-5. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1950) (hereinafter cited as H.R. REF. No. 1191) ; A~r'y
GEN. Comm. REP. 117.
150. The Commission has considered only one anti-merger case since the 1950 Amend-
ment. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH Tx-.nE REG. REP. f 11582 (FTC
Dec. 28, 1953). Another is pending. Crown-Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180. The
MERGER REPORT, based on information in FTC files, indicates that 9 firms acquired 10 or
more firms between 1948 and 1954. Id. at 29. Yet, no complaint has issued against any of
these firms, many of whom are market leaders (minimum assets, $49 million; average for
the 9 firms, $215.9 million). Thus far the Department of Justice has been no more
aggressive. See statement of Judge Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General.
Hearings Before the Select Committee on Small Business to Consider the At'y Gen.
Comm. Rep., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
151. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11582 (FTC
Dec. 28,1953).
152. It was also second nationally in sales of family flour and flour-based mixes. Ibid.
153. It had increased its sales from $47 million to $224.5 million between 1940 and 1951,
a period in which it had acquired many other firms in the industry. Ibid.
154. Duff had been the fifth largest seller of mixes in the national and southeastern
markets. Pillsbury paid $2 million for Duff.
Ballard & Ballard ranked third in sales of mixes and family flour in the southeastern
market. It had been an "important factor in the competitive market." Pillsbury acquired
Ballard & Ballard for $5 million. Ibid.
155. See note 154 supra.
The FTC accepted counsel's argument that only the urban market was the area of
"effective competition" for the firms involved in the acquisition. See Appellate Brief for
FTC, Pillsbury Mills, Inc., pp. 4, 37.. Figures therefore pertain to that area, and are
based upon market surveys and best estimates prepared by Pillsbury in an attempt to
convince the Commission that a formal proceeding would not be necessary. See FTC
Reply Brief to Respondent's Opposing Brief, pp. 2-3. Respondent's Opposing Brief had
argued that the figures were only estimates, and did not accurately depict market realities.
Id. at 41. But Pillsbury refused to respond to a subpoena duces tecuim to produce more
accurate information. FTC Reply Brief, supra, pp. 2-3. For this reason, and because no
completely accurate data existed for the market (and could not be compiled at a reasonable
cost), the FTC overruled the examiner's finding that the evidence was unreliable. Pills-
bury Mills, Co., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 11582 (FTC Dec. 28, 1953).
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that market.15' Furthermore, the acquisitions occurred in an industry heading
rapidly towards oligopolistic concentration.'5 7  And they unquestionably
hastened that drift.Y5 s The FTC concluded that the evidence established a
prima facie case of illegality under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 1 9
More important than the holding, however, is Chairman Howrey's ex-
tensive discussion of the standards the FTC will follow in its future anti-
merger cases. The "new" FTC's test of illegality under section 7 will be
"somewhere in between" the Sherman Act test of actual injury to competition
and a per se test of quantitative substantiality.'0 0 The scope of the inquiry will
be as wide as all the economic factors, as in a Sherman Act case, but the
standard of proof will be less rigid. 16' How much less will be worked out
"case by case.' 01 2
The substantiality of the sales and market shares of the merging firms will
be important evidentiary factors.' 63 However, they must be buttressed with
evidence of the competitive structure of the industry and markets involved, so
156. By acquiring Ballard & Ballard, Pillsbury's share of the southeastern market
for bakery flour rose from second (3.6%) to first (8.1%) place and its sales increased
40%. In mixes, its sales increased 78% and it boosted its first place margin from 22%
to 45%. In family flour its sales rocketed 154% as it rose from fifth (4.9%) to second
(8.5%). And by acquiring Duff, Pillsbury's national position in mixes rose from second
(16%) to first (23%). Ibid. The full significance of the increases lies in the fact that
Pillsbury's market shares increased more than the combined shares it and the acquired
firms had enjoyed before the acquisition.
157. The flour milling industry is "saturated." Only large millers can increase or
even maintain their sales. From 1945 to 1951 the total output capacity of the industry
decreased, but the relative and absolute output capacity of the ten top mills increased.
This was due largely (68%) to mergers. Further, largely due to mergers, the total num-
ber of mills has decreased from 11,691 in 1909 to 1,799 in 1951. And there has been no
new entry in the southeastern market in recent years. Ibid.
158. Evidence of two types was introduced to substantiate this point:
1) Whereas there had been price competition between Pillsbury and Ballard & Ballard
before the acquisition, their prices were identical afterwards. See Pillsbury MIills Record
at 290, 379, Appendix Tables pp. 14-17.
2) The industrial pattera was being significantly altered. The market was composed
of three types of sellers: large ones like Pillsbury or General Mills; small rural millers
who could not compete with the large firms in the urban markets, even at a lower price;
and middle-sized firms like Ballard & Ballard or Duff, who were big enough so that the
large firms could not ignore them, but small enough to be sensitive to the lower-priced
rural firms. By taking the middle-sized firms off the market, competitive contact between
the small and large firms was removed. FTC Appellate Brief, p. 48.
159. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RE . 1 11582 (FTC




162. Ibid. The Commission pointed to United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495 (1948), as a concrete example of a case where a merger, legal under the Sherman
Act, would be illegal under amended § 7 of the Clayton Act. Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,
Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f1 11582 (FTC Dec. 28, 1953).
163. Ibid.
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that the Commission may evaluate the impact of the acquisition within a
structural context.'6 Proof that competitors are foreclosed from access to a
substantial share of the market might be sufficient to permit an inference of
competitive injury under section 3, because that section was enacted primarily
to protect competitors' access to market outlets.165 But the Commission stated
that the primary purpose of section 7 is to protect the pattern of competition., 3
The FTC will look to the types of effects that Congress stated were sympto-
matic of competitive injury: 1) the elimination of a firm which had been a
substantial competitive force in the market; 2) an increase in the relative size
of the acquiring firm that tended to give it a decisive advantage over its com-
petitors; 3) an undue reduction in the number of competing firms; or 4) the
establishment of relations between buyers and sellers which deprive their
competitors of a fair opportunity to compete with them.167 But no single
characteristic of an acquisition will be sufficient to permit an inference of its
probable effect on competition in general.168
The FTC was not justified in making the blanket statement, without
authority and without qualification, that section 7 was directed only towards
preventing adverse changes in the pattern of competition "in general," and
not towards protecting competitors from the foreclosure of substantial shares
of relevant markets. 69 Competition is not a thing; it cannot be injured;
164. The FTC flatly stated that it would be insufficient to show that "an acquiring
and acquired company together control a substantial amount of sales, or that a substantial
portion of commerce is affected." Ibid. "Analysis of the competitive effects of an acquisi-
tion should begin, we believe, with the relevant facts concerning the competitive pattern
of the industry as a whole and its markets. .. ." (Emphasis added.) From there counsel
should introduce evidence of the merger and its changes on the "character of the com-
petition in the markets concerned." Ibid.
This does not seem to be dictum. Counsel had argued that it had established a prima
faie case of illegality by showing that respondent was a leading factor in the relevant
market, and that the acquired companies had done a substantial amount of business. FTC
Appellate Brief, p. 36. The FTC rejected this argument without explicit mention, and
rested its decision on the structural evidence counsel had produced in case their major
argument were rejected. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TnanE REG.
REP. f 11582 (FTC Dec. 28, 1953).
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid. The Commission relied upon H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 149, at 8,
where these tests were explicitly adopted by the House Committee.
168. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TADn REG. REP. f 11582 (FTC
Dec. 28, 1953).
169. Congress intended § 7's standards of legality to be "similar to those which the
courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used in other sections of the
Clayton Act." H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 149, at 8; see S. RaP. No. 1775, supra note
146, at 4-5; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233, 238-40 (1953) ; Note, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 766 (1952) ;
Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1951). See also Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
H.R. 2734 of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1949-
50) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2734), in which the Subcommittee repeatedly
referred to the standard of Standard Stations. Hearings on H.R. 2734, supra, at 31-32, 53,
144, 163, 169-71, 200. But see MERGER RE:PoRT 162.
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competitors can. The real issue is how much evidence of what sorts of injury
to which competitors-present or potential-must be presented in order to
establish the requisite likelihood of competitive injury.170 The types of evi-
dence that Congress pinpointed as symptomatic of injury to competition are
crucial.' 71 But evidence of each type is not necessary in order to establish a
prima facie case of illegality.
172
The FTC must further analyze the different types of mergers and the differ-
ent types of injuries to which they expose competitors, rather than assume
that injury must be shown to competition "in general." There are three
functionally distinct types of mergers: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate.
78
Each may have a different impact on competition. 174 The types of evidence
required should vary with the type of merger.17 5 The amounts of evidence
170. "Competition" is the result of a large number of firms competing with each
other and unable to prevent still others from entering the market to compete with them.
Practices that reduce the number of competitors, or impede their ability to compete with
larger firms, must, by definition, tend to lessen "competition." If a substantial share of
competitors are disadvantaged, if any are substantially disadvantaged, or if entry is im-
paired, the potential injury to "competition" that § 7 proscribes is shown. See notes 171-
76 infra and accompanying text.
171. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
172. See Ar'y GEN. Comm. REP. 122; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233, 241 n.39 (1953). But
see Barnes, supra note 146, at 300, who feels that unless each type of test is used it will
not be possible to decide on an empirical basis which tests really are most appropriate to
different types of mergers.
The purpose of amending § 7 was to forestall mergers that might lessen competition
before they could actually injure competition. See note 149 supra. Thus mergers that
were not substantial would be illegal if they were a part of a cumulative drift towards
lessened competition. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 146, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra
note 149, at 6; Hearings on H.R. 2734, supra note 169, at 131, 135-38. And the scope of
the market could be any line of commerce, whether or not it was a large part of the busi-
ness of any firms involved. See note 146 supra. Thus, it would seem only consistent to
conclude that whenever it is shown that one of the sorts of injuries which Congress sought
to avoid, see note 167 supra, is likely to occur in one of the relevant markets, the merger
would be illegal if further explanatory evidence were not introduced. But the introduction
of explanatory evidence should be the burden of the respondent. See notes 80-83 supra
and accompanying text.
173. Of recent mergers, about half have been horizontal, while about a quarter each
have been vertical and conglomerate. See note 147 supra. The differences are defined in
text at notes 177, 185, 195 infra. See also MERGER REPORT 168; BURNS, THE DECLINE OF
ComPETiTiON 418 (1936). Congress recognized the three different types of mergers and
meant each to come within the amended Act whenever likely to lessen competition. See
H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 149, at 8; MERGER REPORT 168; Barnes, supra note 146,
at 281. Horizontal and vertical mergers are the more likely to lessen competition. See
Avr'v GEN. Comma. REP. 122.
174. ATr'v GEN. Coma. REP. 122; Barnes, supra note 146, at 293; cf. MERGER RE-
PORT 173; Schwartz, The Impact of Standard Oil of California v. United States on the
Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 31 (1949).
175. See ATr'Y GEN. Comm. REp. 122; Barnes, supra note 146, at 299, 300; Note, 63
YALE L.J. 233, 241 n.39 (1953).
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required should also vary accordingly, but always in line with Congress' man-
date to proscribe anti-competitive mergers in their incipiency.'76
A horizontal merger combines firms that were in direct competition with
each otherA77 This necessarily reduces the number of competitors in the
market. Congress has stated that an "undue" reduction in the number of
competitors is indicative of a merger's illegality.178 What is an "undue" reduc-
tion in the "number" of competitors should depend upon the market shares
of the merging firms. For ordinarily, the quality of the competition in a market
varies directly with the number of competitors, and ease of entry varies in-
versely with their size.179 By merging with a competitor rather than building
new facilities, the acquiring firm reduces the number of competitors at the
same time as it expands its size.' 80 Therefore if the merging firms, taken
together, did a "substantial" share of the business in the market, their merger
should be prima facie illegal.:''
This standard might preclude larger firms from merging.'82 However, those
firms can accommodate any genuine need for expansion without taking
competitors off the market. When they acquire competitors the acquisition
176. See notes 149, 172-73 supra.
177. See note 173 supra.
178. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
179. See FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949). STOCKING & WATKINS,
MONOPOLY AND Fazz ENTERPRISE (1951) ; Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 577, 631-41 (1953); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233, 240 (1953).
180. See note 148 supra and authorities there cited. See also Clark, The Orientation
of Antitrust Policy, 40 AM. EcoN. REv. 93, 96-97 (Supp. 1950) ; Kahn, A Legal and
Economic Appraisal of the 'New' Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 342-43
(1954). Moreover, large firms generally have greater capital reserves, and are likely to
"pay a premium for eliminating competition" through acquisition. See Schwartz, supra
note 174, at 31.
181. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233, 239-40 (1953). In a saturated industry, or one with
high costs of entry, a figure well below 10% might be "substantial." See notes 79-SO,
120-21 supra and accompanying text; text following note 183 infra. Ordinarily, however,
a merger of firms controlling 10% of a market's business would be likely to have a sub-
stantially adverse effect upon competition in the market. See Bain, Workable Competition
in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40 AM. EcoN.
REv. 35, 37 (Supp. 1950) ; Bowman, supra note 179, at 638-4l; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233,
241 n.39 (1953).
Furthermore, it might be found that the reduction is "undue" because of foreclosures
of market access to dealers at different levels of processing. If the merging firms had
been engaged in price (or product) competition before the merger, their customers were
given live market alternatives. But if the merger resulted in a one-priced product for
both firms (as it did in Pillsbury, see note 158 supra), customers are foreclosed from
market alternatives. And suppliers are in the same position if the two firms consolidate
their buying to achieve volume discounts. If alternatives are substantially lessened by the
merger, even in other markets, it would seem to fit within § 7 proscriptions. See notes
191-92 infra and accompanying text. Thus, the "substantiality" may be defined in terms
of a different (and possibly smaller) market.
182. The legislative history tends to indicate that Congress had this sort of ban in
mind. See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 146, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 149,
at 6; Hearings on H.R. 2734, szapra note 169, at 131, 135-38.
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ordinarily "may" injure competition, and the firms should have the burden of
showing that "substantial," in the particular industry, is not equivalent to
"undue." Structural and behavioral evidence tending to show that a merger
does not endanger freedom of entry might be admissible to rebut a prima facie
case once established.18 3 But aside from FTC counsel's initial description of
the relevant markets, the burden of introducing and proving such evidence
should rest on the merging firm..8 4 Counsel should, of course, be free to intro-
duce structural and behavioral evidence to show that comparatively small
market shares are, in the particular market setting, nevertheless "substantial."
A vertical merger integrates an acquiring firm with one to which it sold its
products (forward vertical integration) or from whom it bought the raw
materials necessary to process its products (backward vertical integration).185
These mergers may lessen competition in the markets of either the acquiring
or the acquired firms.'8 6
At the market level of the acquired firm vertical integration is a permanent,
proprietary form of exclusive dealing and tying arrangement. 187 Firms inte-
grate vertically in order to assure themselves of a source of supply or a
market outlet, 8 8 and they ordinarily will deal exclusively with the channel
they have acquired.'8 9 They could accomplish these same results by building
183. See MERGER REPORT 135; Barnes, supra note 146, at 291; Schwartz, supra note
174, at 32; Howrey, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 10 (1955) (mimeograph). Of course, in some in-
stances the market shares involved may be so substantial that evidence of free entry would
be superfluous. Cf. notes 122, 181 supra.
184. See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 173 supra. Of 22.5% of recent mergers that were vertical, 12.5% were
"backward," i.e., to assure supplies.
186. Barnes, supra note 146, at 292, 299; cf. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 71, at 171-
75; Dnumu.A & KAnN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 141-50. However, it should not be necessary
to look to injury at each level once injury is shown to be likely at either. See notes 172-
73 suepra and accompanying text.
187. See Arr'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 28, 29; DILAm & KArHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at
173; Kahn, supra note 180, at 344; McLaren, Related Problems of 'Requirements Con-
tracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Antitrust Laws, 45 ILL. L. REV.
141, 142-43 (1950). Cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 523 (1948).
Kahn, supra, at 345, suggests, however, that if a firm "is willing to assume the risks of
ownership, it must be permitted a wider measure of control than where it is contracting
with independent parties."
188. ATv'y GEN. Comm. REP. 122; Rostow & Sachs, Entry Into the Oil Refining
Business: Vertical Integration Re-examned, 61 YALE L.J. 856, 870 (1.952); cf. Barnes,
sup;-a note 146, at 292; Schwartz, supra note 174, at 31.
189. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 523 (1947); McLaren,
supra note 187, at 158; Rostow & Sachs, supra note 188, at 877. This is to be expected,
of course, for the integration will ordinarily lower the aggregate cost. See id. at 878;
Kahn, supra note 180, at 343; Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J.
PoL EcoN. 347-52 (1950). Cost savings are a major reason for integrating. See Adelman,
Integration and Public Policy, 63 -ARv. L. REv. 27, 40, 47 (1949).
Of course, the acquiring firm's needs (backward integration) seldom will mesh per-
fectly with the acquired firm's output. Thus, to some extent, the integrated firm will
deal with competitors or waste capacity. Id. at 44.
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new outlets or supply channels, which would increase competition in the next
adjacent market. 190 But when an enterprise purchases an existing channel
it forecloses competitors of the acquired firm from supplies or outlets to the
extent that they bought from the acquiring firm (in a forward integration)
or sold to it (in a backward integration),391 If the merger foreclosed these
competitors from access to a "substantial" share of the relevant market, it
should be prima facie illegal-just as in section 3 cases. The type of injury
is virtually indistinguishable except that the merger, being permanent, creates
a more complete foreclosure than would an exclusive dealing or tying arrange-
ment.
192
Even if the acquiring firm continues to buy from or sell to former com-
petitors of the acquired branch, the merger may lessen competition at either
market level. If the acquiring firm is sufficiently dominant in its own market
that former competitors of its acquired firm must deal with it, the acquiring
firm may be able to put them at its mercy by juggling profit margins and
instituting an inter-market "squeeze." For when a firm is integrated, it is
irrelevant to it at which stage of its operations it formally enters its profits.
Thus, in a forward integration, it can set an arbitrarily high price to competitors
of its acquired branch. This would squeeze those competitors, because they
must compete in price with the acquired branch at resale. Their profit margin
is sliced, while the integrated firm may average its correspondingly lower
profit in the resale market with the higher profit it is thereby enabled to make
in the processing market.1 93 The same competitive squeeze may be applied at
the level of the acquiring firm if, by the acquisition, it attains or is on its way
to attaining dominance in an adjacent market to which its competitors must
sell or from which they must buy. Of course, a firm must have considerably
more than a "substantial" share of a market in order to institute a squeeze.
It must have effective leadership in an imperfect market. However, "mon-
opoly" size is probably unnecessary. And it should not be necessary to show
an actual intent to squeeze. There is sufficient coercive power latent in such
a situation to make the likelihood of real competition in either market virtually
nil.1
94
190. See notes 148, 180 supra.
191. See CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 122; McLaren, supra note 187, at
158. Moreover, the foreclosures may extend beyond the immediately merging firms, for
competitors of each may find it necessary to integrate "defensively" in order to keep their
own positions. See Rostow & Sachs, supra note 188, at 878-79; Hale, Vertical Integration,
49 CoLum. L. REv. 921, 936-37, 949-52 (1949).
192. See McLaren, supra note 187, at 141; notes 92-93, 97-99, 110-13 supra and accom-
panying text.
193. See United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 433-45 (2d Cir. 1945), especial-
ly approved, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813 (1946) ; DIRLAI
& KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 141-50; EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 71, at 171-75;
Adelman, supra note 189, at 44; Barnes, supra note 146, at 299. The same sort of squeeze
may, of course, be worked in a backward integration.
194. Mavericks would then exist, if at all, at the dominant firm's pleasure. See au-
thorities cited note 193 supra.
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"Conglomerate" mergers combine firms with no previous competitive rela-
tionship.' r They are far less likely to injure competition. The desire to
diversify is commercially sound, and it is unwise to prevent firms from
entering new markets without good reason.' 96 However, the very ability of
some large firms to utilize their size and market leverage to absorb losses and
acquire price favors may make it unwise to permit them to expand by acquisi-
tion into other imperfect markets. 197 In these cases it is quite true that no single
characteristic can earmark the competitive probabilities of a merger ;198 the
FTC should inquire into all the indicia of illegality which Congress enumer-
ated.' 99 Further consideration should center upon the susceptibility of the mar-
kets to monopolistic leverage, and upon the anti-competitive records of the
firms.200
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT BY THE "NEW" FTC
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
forbids a seller to discriminate in price by selling like commodities to different
customers at different prices, whenever the effect of that discrimination "may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such discrimination,
or with the customers of either of them .... -201 The policy of the Act is to
give small businessmen a chance to compete on equal terms with larger firms
who are not more efficient: to recognize economies of size, but not economies
of leverage and coercion.20 2 The Act also makes it illegal for a buyer "know-
195. See note 173 supra.
196. See DIRLAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 141; Kahn, Standards For Anti-
trust Policy, 67 HARP. L. REv. 28, 47 (1953) ; cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 526 (1948).
197. See EDWARDs, op. cit. supra note 71, at 108-17, 130; MERGER REPORT 103; QuINN,
GIANT BUsINESs: THREAT TO DzmocRAcy 167, 200, 227-28 (1953); Kahn, supra note
196 at 42.
198. See A-r'y GEN. Comrmt. REP. 119; Barnes, supra note 146, at 299.
199. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
200. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ; DnRLAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 104; EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 71, at 159-67; cf. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948). Thus, although "intent" is not in issue, intent
plus power may "be taken into account in arriving at a judgment as to the probable effects
of an acquisition." MERGER REPORT 159.
201. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), amending 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
(Emphasis added.) The italicized language was added by the 1936 amendment, which was
enacted primarily to counteract the discriminatory practices of chain stores by lowering
the standard of injury required. See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Con-
fusion: Another Look at Robiuson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951) ; Notes, 36 COLUI.
L. REv. 1285 (1936), 50 HARv. L. REV. 106 (1936).
202. The value of Robinson-Patman lies in "the assurance of equal opportunity and
fair play which this bill gives to local independent business .. " Statement of Congress-
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ingly" to accept a discrimination, 20 3 but, in view of the Supreme Court's re-
strictive decision in Automatic Canteen,20 4 it is unlikely that the "new" FTC
will even attempt to prosecute buyers.
20 5
In actions against the seller, the injury alleged may be to competitors of the
seller ("primary-line" competition) or to competitors of the buyer ("secon-
dary-line" competition) or their customers.2 0 6 The FTC has the burden of
proving the fact of discrimination and the likelihood of competitive injury.
20 T
Sellers may defend absolutely by proving that price differences made only "due
allowance" for differences in costs,208 or that the differences were made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.
2 0 9
man Utterback, 80 CONG. REC. 9416 (1936) ; see S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 42-43 (1948). Economic studies indicate that price discrimination is usually based
upon market leverage and buying power, rather than increasing economies of size. See
EDwAXDs, op. cit. supra note 71, at 161, and studies there cited. The FTC Chain Store
Investigations, which led to the passage of Robinson-Patman, made it perfectly clear that
this was true in chain store selling. See S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1934).
203. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1952). This subsection provides that
"it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . ..knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by" subsection (a).
204. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). In this ambiguous decision
the Supreme Court apparently held that the FTC could not establish a prima facie case
of illegality against a buyer simply by showing that he knowingly induced or received
a price discrimination; rather, the FTC must come forward with evidence showing the
buyer knew or should have known that the discrimination was illegal, i.e., not justified
by differences in cost. Id. at 80. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 260 (1953).
205. Since Automatic Canteen, supra note 204, was decided, FTC decisions under
§ 2(f) generally have been limited to dismissing complaints brought before the Canteen
decision. See, e.g., Kroger Co., Docket No. 5991, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11513 (FTC
Sept. 1953) ; Safeway Stores, Docket No. 5990, 3 id. 11474 (FTC Aug. 1953) ; Crown
Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 5421, 3 id. 25352 (FTC Feb. 1955). However, it is still
possible to obtain a conviction by showing a discrimination, proving it was not cost
justified, and then proving the buyer knew or should have known it was not cost justified.
Borden-Aicklen Auto Supply Co., Docket No. 5766, 3 id. 1 25071. (FTC May 1954) (re-
fusal to dismiss complaint).
206. See text at note 201 supra; AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMSINATION AND RELATED
PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 46 (1952); Comment, The Standard of
Injury Applicable to Primary-Line Competition, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 209 (1954).
207. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. denied for lateness in filing, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); but see S. H. Moss, Inc.
v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), is often cited contra, but is ambiguous on the point.
See note 211 infra.
208. Originally § 2 permitted price discrimination based upon quantity; Robinson-
Patman significantly changed the section by proscribing all discounts that a seller could
not prove were justified by actual cost savings. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S.
37, 43 (1948) ; Goodyear Tire Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
557 (1939) ; Rowe, supra note 201, at 930; notes 48-61 supra and accompanying text.
Another important change is that any discount, even if justified by cost differences,
may be disallowed or limited if the buyers benefited by it are so few as to make the dis-
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Recent FTC decisions in secondary-line cases seem consistent with the policy
of the Robinson-Patman Act. In the Morton Salt case 210 the Supreme Court
held that a discrimination requiring one customer to pay more than his com-
petitors, for like goods, necessarily lessened his ability to compete equally with
them, so that the fact of discrimination alone is sufficient basis for the requisite
inference of competitive injury.2 1 1 In the recent series of Auto Part cases 212
count especially promotive of monopoly. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
See Quantity Limit Rule 203-1 (Dec. 1951), 17 FED. REG. 113 (1952), 2 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. f" 3611.01 (1954). The principle of the quantity limit proviso is that "economies
of mere size do not justify the risk of monopoly." Id. at p. 5385. See also S. REP. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). The
only quantity limit ever imposed by the FTC is now being challenged in the courts. See
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
209. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952), provides that a seller may
rebut a prima facie case of illegality by proving that his discrimination was "made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ... ." In Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), the Supreme Court held that such a defense was an absolute
justification. But compare this decision, with id. at 251-67 (dissent), and with statement of
Congressman Utterback, 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936). Senators Kefauver and Patman have
proposed amendments "reversing" Standard Oil, but Congress has not yet acted upon
them. See N.Y. Times, March 29, 1953, pt. III, ). 1, col. 2; March 19, 1953, p. 47, col. 5.
The limits of the "meeting competition" defense have been fairly well staked out in
Supreme Court decisions. The discriminatory price must be in good faith and defensively
responsive to an individual competitive situation. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra
at 251; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721-25 (1948) ; FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746, 754-56 (1945). These cases state that the cut price must be a departure
from seller's pricing system rather than an integral part of it; that the discrimination must
result from a reduction in one area to meet competition rather than a rise in an area
where competition is not so keen; that the lowered price may not go below competitors'
prices; and that the competitors' price that is thus met must be a legal price. The "new"
FTC appears to have adopted these criteria in Niehoff & Co., Docket No. 5768, 3 CCH
Tr,.DE REG. REP. ff 25467, at pp. 35582-83 (FTC May 1955) ; E. Edelmann & Co., Docket
No. 5770, 3 id. ff 25445 (FTC May 1955).
210. FTCv. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
211. Id. at 44. The Court held that the discrimination was "likely" to injure com-
petition even though the amount was small, and salt constituted a minor part of the
general inventory carried by the grocer-buyers. Their profit margin was small, and any
discrimination would disadvantage them. Id. at 48, 49. The same standard applies in pri-
vate treble-damage actions, for the discriminatorily high price is "an added business ex-
pense placed upon plaintiff and necessarily adversely affected the chances of plaintiff to
survive the keen competition." Russelville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
484, 493 (W.D. Ark. 1949); see Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
176 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950). These cases indicate that
lack of injury is a positive defense. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 197, 204 (1954).
But see Iinneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied for lateness in filing, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
In the Honeywell case the court held that discriminations in the price of thermostats,
to customers who manufactured boilers, was not sufficiently important to warrant a pre-
sumption of competitive disadvantage, despite an FTC finding that it would. Id. at 191
F.2d 790-91. It is not clear, however, whether the court found that there was not a prima
facie case of injury or that it had been rebutted. At any rate, the decision appears to be
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the "new" FTC followed and extended the Morton Salt rule. The Commission
held that in industries working on low profit margins, even small differentials
were competitively significant enough to raise a rebuttable presumption of
illegal injury. 213 And the presumption was not rebutted by testimony of dis-
favored customers that there had been no actual injury because, by the nature
of the market involved, their ability to compete on equal terms was necessarily
prejudiced.
214
The FTC has stated, however, that different considerations are brought into
play when a seller sets significantly different prices to customers who do not
compete with each other. The price differences are still "discriminations"
within the meaning of the Act,215 but the injury, if any, will be in the
against the weight of authority, and in conflict with the Supreme Court's Morton Salt
decision. See justice Black's dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari on procedural
grounds. Id. at 344 U.S. 206. See note 217 infra.
212. Whitaker Cable Corp., Docket No. 5722, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25443 (FTC
May 1955) ; Moog Industries, Inc., Docket No. 5723, 3 id. ff 25444 (FTC May 1955) ; E.
Edelman & Co., Docket No. 5770, 3 id. 25445 (FTC May 1955) ; Niehoff & Co., Docket
No. 5768, 3 id. 25467 (FTC May 1955). The cases are quite similar and, for convenience,
future references shall be made to the Whitaker case, which is representative.
213. Respondent had given its customers quantity discounts based upon total net pur-
chases of its automotive parts. The discounts were progressive, and large volume cus-
tomers had received substantially lower prices than smaller competitors. Whitaker Cable
Corp., supra note 212, at pp. 35546-49. The FTC thought that since the profit margins in
the industry were small, "Any savings or advantage in price obtained by one competitor,
as against another increases his margin of profit, permits additional services to be ex-
tended to customers. . . ." Id. at p. 35549.
214. The industry was following a system of retail price maintenance, so that cus-
tomers getting lower prices were unable to undersell their competitors. Thus, disfavored
customers testified that they had not actually been injured. Ibid. But the Commission
held that only a likelihood of injury was necessary to proscribe the discriminations, and
it found that likelihood in the narrowed margins of profit the lower volume customers had
to face. Ibid.
215. Originally, § 2 was aimed at preventing manufacturers from gaining monopolies
by means of local price-cutting. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
But this practice fell into desuetude after 1914. See CLARK, ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD
COSTS 424 (1923); WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPnTITIVE PRACTICES IN Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISE 66-68 (3d ed. 1940). The Robinson-Patman amendment was aimed at
a different problem. See note 201 supra. But it did include inter-market discriminations
within its proscriptions. See statement of Congressman Utterback, 80 CoNG. REC. 9416
(1936) ; statement of Senator Logan, 80 id. at 31.13. But see PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PAT-
MAN Act 50-58 (1938), stating that if the sale is at more than cost and without predatory
intent the Act does not apply. The latter is not legislative history, of course. And the
weight of authority precludes any argument that inter-market discrimination may not be
illegal. See citation of authority in Purex Corp., Docket No. 6008, unreported initial
decision, April 16, 1954, at 6, 14, "finalized" by Commission failure to review, 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ff 25172 (FTC Sept. 27, 1954).
"Territorial" price discrimination may, of course, occur between markets that are
separated functionally rather than geographically. See EDWARDS, Op. cit. supra note 71,
at 159; cf. the Spark Plug cases, Docket Nos. 3977, 5620, 5624, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RaP.
11467 (FTC July 10,1953).
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primary-rather than the secondary-line. 216 And in these cases the FTC will
not follow the presumptions that the Supreme Court established in Morton
Salt; it will require more economic evidence and a more rigorous standard
of proof before inferring a likelihood of competitive injury.
2 17
Territorial Price Discrimination: The General Foods Case
The most important primary-line decision of the "new" FTC is General
Foods Corp.218 In 1939 General Foods dominated the market for pectin
products, but its patents on liquid pectin had expired and its market share
began to decline. 219 Therefore, in 1940 it began to give "deals" whereby con-
216. Injury in the primary-line is to competing sellers rather than to customers.
These sellers need not sell goods of like grade and quality so long as they are trying
to get to the same general class of customers. See E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d
511 (6th Cir. 1944) ; McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 461
(W.D. Mo. 1948) ; Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 209, 211 (1954). But see Midland Oil
Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436, 438 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
217. See General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 25069
(FTC April 27, 1954) ; Purex Corp., Docket No. 6008, unreported initial decision, April
16, 1954, "finalized" by Commission failure to review, 3 id. J 25172 (FTC Sept. 27, 1954) ;
Spark Plug cases, Docket Nos. 3977, 5620, 5624, 3 id. 1f 11647 (FTC July 10, 1953). See
notes 222-27 infra and accompanying text.
In General Foods Corp., supra, the FTC stated: "The standard for determining the
unlawfulness of an unjustified price discrimination ... is the same whether the competitive
injury occurs at the seller level or at the customer level." But it concluded, relying on a
1948 FTC Statement of Policy referring to the different problem of basing point selling,
that the Supreme Court's decision in Morton Salt "could not automatically be applied in
cases of territorial price discrimination"; more evidence of competitive effects would be
required. 3 id. IT 25069, at 35211 (FTC April 27, 1954).
The Supreme Court apparently took the opposite position in the Morton Salt case,
although in dictum. It approved S. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), which stated that the fact of discrimination was grounds for
a prima facie inference of competitive injury in the primary-line. See Morton Salt Co. v.
FTC, 334 U.S. 37, 45 n.13 (1948). See also Standard Brands, Inc. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 510,
515 (2d Cir. 1951), reaffirming Moss in light of the Supreme Court approval.
The "new" FTC does not approve of the Moss case, however, and has indicated that
it will not follow it. See General Foods Corp., supra, at pp. 35212-13; note 284 infra.
218. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE R.E. REP. IT 25069 (FTC
April 27, 1954).
219. In 1939 General Foods sold to 75-80% of the national market and 50% of the
western market for liquid pectin. Id. at p. 35210. Moreover, it sold to 40% of the national
market and to 25% of the western market for powdered pectin. Ibid. General Foods
thought that the western market accounted for 25% of its total pectin sales. See letter
from Mr. J. Axelrod, Products Manager, to Mrs. Myers, President, Nov. 11, 1942, Com-
mission Exhibit 28B in General Foods Record.
In 1939 and 1940, after the patent on liquid pectin expired, General Foods lost heavily
to, Mutual Citrus Products (MCP), a west coast competitor. General Foods Corp., supra
note 218. In the Pacific Northwest its market shares for liquid and powdered pectin
dropped 8.7% and 5.6% in 1939; in the Southwest, the drop was only 2% and 2.8% re-
spectively. Commission Exhibit 21. This exhibit is based upon data compiled for General
Foods by a commercial surveying company. See notes 228-34 infra.
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sumers in the western market got a "free" package with every two packages
they bought.22 0 But it did not make the same deal available to consumers in
other markets.221 The sole question was whether the deals were likely to
injure competition between General Foods and sellers competing with it in
the western market.
The FTC held that counsel had failed to establish a probability of competi-
tive injury. Evidence that General Foods' sales and market shares had shot
up,222 and testimony by competing sellers that they had in fact been injured,22 3
was not thought persuasive. For during the "deal" period there had been
active and virile price competition, competitors' sales had increased appreciably
and competitor's prices had been generally less than the "deal" price.2 4 The
220. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25069 (FTC
April 27, 1954). The "deal" cases came to grocers in sets of three; a customer could get
all three packages for the regular price of two. See Initial Decision, General Foods Corp.,
Docket No. 5675 (August 1952), at 1. Thus, in 1946, the last year of the deal, General
Foods was selling a case of Certo (its liquid pectin) for $3.18 in the western markets;
in other markets the same case cost $4.30. And Sure-Jell, its powdered pectin, was going
at $2.57, as against an ordinary price of $3.18. Ibid. See Commission Exhibit 99. See
note 241 infra.
221.. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25069 (FTC
April 27, 1954). Mr. Axelrod explained to Mrs. Myers that the "deal" should be used in
the Pacific states because an outright price reduction would "inevitably force us to reduce
the price nationally." Commission Exhibit 21, 22.
222. In 1940 General Foods gave deals on Sure-Jell and gained back ground it had
lost to MCP the previous year. See note 219 supra. However, it gave no deals on Certo
and lost further ground to MCP. In 1941 it gave deals on both products and gained sub-
stantially on both. Letter from Mr. Axelrod to Mrs. Myers, Nov. 1942, Commission
Exhibit 28 B-C in General Foods Record. The hearing examiner found as a fact that "the
deal was advantageous to respondent, enabling it to increase its sales and improve its
competitive position in that territory." Initial Decision, Docket No. 5675 (August 1952),
at 4. The FTC's decision ignored these facts and findings. See notes 228-34 infra and
accompanying text.
223. This testimony came primarily from Mr. H. Leo, President of the competing
MCP company. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 25069
(FTC April 27, 1954). See General Foods Record at pp. 307, 536.
Typical of the type of injury alleged is the situation in 1947, after General Foods had
temporarily abandoned the deals. MCP announced a 10% price increase to meet rising
costs. General Foods then announced that it would resume the deals. Its price would
have undercut MCP at that point, so MCP decided not to raise prices after all. See Com-
mission Exhibits 91-93.
The FTC was more impressed with the fact that MCP's volume of business had in-
creased. See note 224 infra. But its margin of profit had been cut; and General Foods'
volume increased more. See note 241 infra. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that
MCP's volume of sales increased still more, despite a rise in price, after the deals were
discontinued. Record at p. 536.
224. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. Rae. 1 25069 (FTC
April 27, 1954). The FTC seems to have adopted the standards used by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191. F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied for lateness in filing, 344 U.S. 206 (1952) : that competition was keen in the
seller's line; the discriminating seller did not undersell his competitors; the competitors'
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FTC did not think a showing of injury to competition "in general was indis-
pensable," but it did think it necessary to consider "all the competent and
relevant evidence and inferences." 225 Only evidence of a predatory intent to
eliminate competitors would be sufficient to indicate competitive injury per
se.220 In the absence of such evidence the Commission felt it would have to
balance evidence of 1) whether there was vigorous price competition between
the discriminating seller and his competitors; 2) whether the discriminatory
prices were higher or lower than competitors'; and 3) whether the discriminat-
ing seller increased his sales and his market shares at the expense of his com-
petitors.
227
The majority opinion did not consider significant evidence contained in the
record and pointed out in the dissent.ms Inter-office memoranda taken from
General Foods' files made it clear that the intent and effect of the deals was
to keep west coast competitors from expanding into General Foods' lucrative
midwest markets.2 20 It is not possible to determine whether the FTC did not
volume of sales increased, and the discriminating seller's market share shrank. However,
it failed to find evidence of market shares. See notes 228-34 infra and accompanying text.
For a critique of the Hone3ywell standard, see notes 211 supra, 241-46 infra and accom-
panying text.
The hearing examiner had found that there was vigorous competition in the western
market, and that the vigorous competitive battle General Foods' deals forced MCP to
wage "may have" stimulated total consumer demand. Initial Decision at 7. He thought
the deals were a "troublesome problem" to competitors, but that they met it with com-
petition, and that the competition in the area was thereby "helped rather than injured."
Id. at 7. And he found that MCP's sales increased up to 300%, so that in 1947 it outsold
General Foods by 45,000 dozen packages. Id. at 4.
225. Id. at 6. The FTC thought that the considerations listed in note 224 supra, must
all be examined before inferring injury in the primary line. General Foods Corp., Docket
No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REr. REP. ff 25069 (FTC April 27, 1954). It is not necessary
to examine these factors in cases of secondary-line injury, see notes 211-14 supra and
accompanying text, but the Commission thought that the inferences permissible from
secondary-line discrimination "could not automatically be applied" in cases of territorial
price discriminations. General Foods Corp., supra. However, the distinction the FTC
drew between inter-market and intra-market discriminations was founded upon a 1948
Statement of Policy that dealt with territorial discrimination as it occurs in connection
with basing point delivered pricing. Ibid. There was no attempt to discover whether similar
considerations apply when the discrimination is used not to prevent price competition, as in
basing point systems, but to wage selective price competition.
226. Ibid.
227. See note 224 supra.
228. The materials discussed notes 229-31 infra and accompanying text, were pointed
out by Commissioner Mead in dissent. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. f1 25069 (FTC April 27, 1954). The Commission found it unnecessary
to mention them.
229. In December 1939, Mr. Axelrod, Products Manager, informed Mrs. Myers,
President, that the growth and spread of west coast competition was becoming a threat
to General Foods. Commission Exhibit 20. The next year the deals began. See note 220
supra.
In December 1941, Mr. Axelrod reported on the progress of the deals. Although there
was an operating loss on Sure-Jell because of the deals, he felt this was an "investment"
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consider this evidence because it was thought unreliable, or because it thought
an intent to restrain the growth of competition is something less than an
illegal intent to destroy competition. Moreover, although the Commission noted
that General Foods' market position had shot up from 62 to 80 per cent of
the national market during the "deal" years, it stated that statistics showing
its position in the western markets were not "available." 230 Yet statistics in
the record, taken from General Foods' own files, showed that its market
shares had increased from 46 and 56 per cent to 62 and 69 per cent of the
Pacific northwest and southwest markets respectively during the first four
years of the deals.2 31 The FTC did not mention these figures, nor did it in-
dicate why they were not "available."
In other cases the "new" Commission has recognized that statistical data
taken from a respondent's files have great probative value.232 Even if they
are inaccurate representations of market realities, they are very accurate indi-
cations of what respondent thought those realities were. Robinson-Patman
is framed in terms of probable effect,233 but evidence of purpose delineates
in future profits. And apparently he thought it was a successful investment, because by
1941 respondent had "almost doubled our Sure-Jell business and at the same time stopped
the decline on Certo." See Commission Exhibit 27.
In November 1942, Mr. Axelrod stated that, had the deals not made it "tough" for
MCP, they "would have spread eastward at a much faster rate than they did and we
would now be facing some pretty tough competition in the middle-west.... the high Sure-
Jell per capita market." "If we can, by means of this deal operation, confine this com-
petition largely to the far west, I think it is good insurance and that the deal serves a
twofold purpose." Commission Exhibit 28D.
230. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 25069, at p.
35213 (FTC April 27, 1954). The Commission apparently took these figures from the
hearing examiner, see Initial Decision at 3, who derived them from the same source as
the figures for the western market, see note 231 infra, that the Commission found were
not "available."
231. General Foods gauged the success of its deal operations from market surveys
made for it by the Nielsen Company. See Commission Exhibit 19. These reports re-
vealed:
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
General Foods 54.5% 46.1,% 59.1% 56.9% 62.5%
MCP - - - 13.0 15.7
All other competitors 45.5 53.9 40.9 30.9 21.8
YEAR 1938 1939 1940 1941, 1942
PAcIIc SOUTRWEST
General Foods 6 9.9 55.7 52.0 68.2 69.1
MCP - - - 17.7 19.9
All others 27.1 44.3 48.0 14.1 11.0
See Commission Exhibit 28C, 29C in General Foods Record.
232. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Docket No. 6000, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 11582
(FTC Dec. 28, 1953); Crown Zellerbach Corp., Docket No. 6180, 3 id. ff 25458 (FTC
May 1955).
233. See S. Doc. No. 584, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1914) ; S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1914) ; text at note 201 supra.
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the nature of the act and also sheds light on future competitive probabilities. 13 4
For a seller may discriminate between different markets in order to compete
in both; but he may also discriminate to suppress competition, to contain
competition, or to coerce rivals into following his leadership.23 5 Robinson-
Patman does not in terms distinguish between the two instances,230 but evi-
dence showing the seller's intent is certainly relevant in gauging the probable
effects of his pricing. For whenever a sizable seller's purpose in discriminat-
ing is to suppress or contain or coerce competitors it is probable that he "may"
succeed.237 Businessmen ordinarily do not follow commercial policies that are
not likely to succeed; they should have the burden of proving their lack of
"reasonable business judgment" once their intent is shown.
Direct evidence of intent should not be necessary.2 38 Certain types of con-
duct should constitute circumstantial evidence of intent. Selling below cost
indicates an intent to injure competition.23 9 The closer the price comes to
cost, the more readily intent may be inferred. Other significant factors bearing
upon intent include the length and severity of the price cut; the size and
strength of the seller in all the markets he sells in; and, inevitably, his previous
anti-competitive record.
2 40
The decision in General Foods would be erroneous even if there had been
no intent to injure competition. The FTC's finding that General Foods' deal
prices were generally higher than competitors' ignores the fact that General
Foods was selling a premium, nationally advertised product.2 41 The finding
234. "[K]nowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts and pre-
diction of consequences." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372
(1933) ; see E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944). The test of
intent is "not a test of the purity of a company's motives, but an evaluation of its conduct."
DIRLAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 65. See also Kahn, A Legal and Economic
Appraisal of the New Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 317 (1954).
235. See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 215, at 424; EwARDS, Op. cit. supra note 71, at
159. Territorial discrimination is probably used more to discipline non-conformists than
to eliminate them. Therefore it is not necessary to cut the price so deeply or maintain
it so long.
236. See note 234 supra.
237. See Adams, The "Rule of Reason!': Workable Competition or Workable Mo-
nopoly?, 63 YALE L.J. 348, 359 (1954).
238. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 209, 216 (1954); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1949) (conspiracy); Allied Paper Mills v. FTC, 168
F.2d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 1948) (same).
239. Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.
1929); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); SiMoN, GEOGRAPHic
PRICIING 302 (1950). General Foods' prices were, at times, below operating costs. See
note 229 supra; cf. notes 246-56 infra and accompanying text.
240. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 209, 216 (1954). On the importance of an anti-
competitive record see DIRLAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 104; EDWARDS, op. Cit.
supra note 71, at 159, 160-67; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
241, General Foods' national reputation and its patent monopoly on liquid pectin prior
to 1939, see note 219 supra, certainly put it in a premium position over the newcomer MCP,
cf. note 231 supra. Yet in 1947, when MCP was selling at $2.55 per case, General Foods'
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that some competitors were still able to compete with it despite the dis-
criminatory pricing would seem to be irrelevant.2 4 2 Their ability to compete
equally is belied by the large market gains General Foods made at their
expense.2 43 But evidence of those gains should also be unnecessary in order
to establish a prima facie case of competitive injury.2 44 By requiring such
evidence the FTC would obliterate the distinction Congress drew between
injury to competition and injury to competition zwith the person benefiting
from -the discrimination in price. For the purpose of the Robinson-Patman
Act was to prevent price discriminations from lessening the ability of any
businessman to compete on equal terms with any of his competitors.2 4 5
Territorial Price Discrimination: An Economic Appraisal
Territorial price discrimination enables firms with monopolistic leverage in
non-competitive "home" markets to tie that leverage to the economies of size..
2 10
Sure-Jell (regularly selling at $3.18 per case) was given at a deal price of $2.57. See
note 220 supra; Commission Exhibits 99, 103-07, 110-11, 122-23 in General Foods Record.
This margin is hardly sufficient to cover the gap of national advertising and prestige re-
flected in General Foods' normal selling price. See AusTiN, op. cit. supra note 206, at
46; cf. Howrey, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary 15 (1955) (mimeograph).
242. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text. A showing of workable com-
petition despite the use of discriminatory pricing would be even less relevant under thu
standard of Robinson-Patman than it is under other sections of the Clayton Act. See
note 201 supra. Moreover, there was no showing of "workable" competition in General
Foods. As a result of the discrimination only one competitor, MCP, was able effectively
to offer competition to General Foods. Other competitors lost heavily. See -note 231 supra;
General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ir 25069 (FTC April
1954). This step towards duopoly in the market would tend to outweigh the "vigor" of
competition between General Foods and MCP. See note 224 supra. And the low-profit
price competition would be apt to discourage new entrants.
243. See note 231 supra.
244. See notes 201, 206 supra, 246-82 infra and accompanying text If a leading seller
uses a discriminatory price structure to disadvantage his competitors, that should suffice
to establish a prima facie case that he has injured competition between them and himself.
It may ,be that this resulted in his failure to lose as much ground to them as he ordinarily
would have done.
245. The "competition with" language was added to the statute to alleviate difficulties
of proof and to prevent larger sellers from putting their competitors or any of them at a
substantially disadvantageous position by means of discriminatory selling. See S. REP. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936) ;
Statement of Congressman Patman, 80 CoNG. REc. 81.11 (1936) ; Statement of Congress-
man Utterback, 80 id. at 9417; AusTiN, op. cit. supra note 206, at 42; EDWARDS, op. Cit.
supra note 71, at 167; Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 209, 213 (1954) ; Note, 36 COLUZM. L.
REv. 1285, 1287, 1296 (1936). But see Note, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 106, 108 (1955).
246. See notes 249-61. infra and accompanying text. Systematic price discrimination
between markets is not profitable unless there is a substantial degree of control in the
home market. See CLARE, op. cit. supra note 215, at 416-33; BURNS, op. Cit. supra note
173, at 273-74; FExrEa, TEE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 335, 382 (1931). Unless the
discriminating seller is a monopolist or oligopolist, it would be more profitable for him
to lower the price and get more business in the "home" market.
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The discriminating seller is able to utilize excess capacity (at diminishing
costs) by reaching into new markets rather than "spoiling" his market at
home ;247 this in turn permits him to compete in the outlying market with
distinct advantages over local sellers.
248
Territorial discrimination is not possible unless the seller is able to insulate
the buyers in different markets.249 It is not profitable unless he has fixed
costs and excess capacity 23" and unless there are strong elements of monopoly
in his home market.25 1 But in this sense national or regional advertising
which creates consumer demand for a trade-named product is the same as an
idle fixed cost item: it creates an extra capacity to sell the product in other
markets that is useless in the home market, but that can be utilized in other
markets without further outlay.2 52 When these conditions exist, territorial
discrimination enables the national or regional seller to fortify his monopolistic
247. See notes 254-56 infra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 257-60 ilnra and accompanying text.
249. A discrimination must not be great enough to permit the recipient to engage in
arbitrage transactions. If the recipient can re-sell to the seller's disfavored customers at
less than the seller himself is currently charging them, the advantages of discriminating
are nullified. However, deeper price slashes are feasible in an inter-market than an intra-
market discrimination, because there is less opportunity for arbitrage. See BOULDING,
EcoNomic ANALYSIS 533, 538 (1948) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 215, at 419-20; Rowe,
supra note 201, at 936.
250. If a firm is already producing at capacity (i.e., its most efficient point of pro-
duction), the added cost of each added unit it produces thereafter will exceed the added
cost of each previous unit and will also exceed its own average cost. See BOULDI NG, op.
cit. supra note 249, at 563-67; STIGLER, op. cit. supra note 71, at 170; Machlup, Marginal
Analysis and Empirical Research, 36 Am, . EcoN. REV. 519, 523 (1946). This would not
necessarily make discrimination unprofitable, but it would strongly tend to do so.
251. See note 246 supra.
252. It is more usual to view advertising as a variable cost of selling rather than a
fixed expense. If advertising expenditures are successful, they will increase the demand
for the seller's product (make his demand curve more "horizontal"). This will generally
make it more profitable to produce a greater number of units, which would seem to lessen
excess capacity. However, "selling costs per unit are greater than the decrease in pro-
duction costs. The resources expended to achieve this result are therefore greater than
those saved by achieving it. And, of course, the balance of excess capacity remains."
CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 172; see id. at 163-76.
Moreover, advertising outlays often are fixed at a "normal" level by trade practice or
inertia. Id. at 143. Mass national or regional advertising media such as radio and television
may serve communities the seller does not already sell to as well as those to which he does.
The cost is fixed as part of his sales expense in communities he sells to; the excess spills
over into other communities, ready for exploitation. In so far as this advertising creates
a demand for a trade-named product among buyers that are not currently served, the
excess seems functionally equivalent to the excess of plant capacity that makes discrimi-
nation profitable.
Finally, large advertising outlays tend to prevent entry by newer firms. See American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946) ; CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra, at
173; cf. Spark Phlg cases, Docket Nos. 3977, 5620, 5624, 3 CCH TRADE REG. R P". 11467
(FTC July 1953).
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position in his home market and gives him a head start towards establishing
one in the new market.
253
When a regional seller expands into or expands within an outlying market,
his profit in that market is based upon the added cost of the added units he
sells there.254 So long as he has fixed costs and capacity to produce more than
he can sell without lowering the price in the home market, the added cost of
each added unit will be less than the cost of the units sold in the home market,
and less than its own average cost.2r5  The fixed expenses have already been
allocated to the cost of the units sold in the home market.2 5
These cost savings give the regional seller a substantial advantage over
local sellers. He can profitably divert trade from local sellers by selling at
less than average cost.257 He can sell his product at a lower price in the outly-
ing market and still match the profit he makes on equivalent units sold at
higher price in the home market.25 8 The price in the outlying market is "sub-
253. See notes 254-65 in-fra and accompanying text. It is the joint effect as well as
the several that makes territorial discrimination dangerous. Its effects are similar to a ty-
ing contract in that it is anti-competitive in both its markets. The discussion infra centers
upon the effect upon outlying markets through lowered marginal costs. However, as the
seller increases his output towards capacity, his average costs also drop. See CLARK, op.
cit. supra note 215, at 420; BURNS, op. cit. supra note 173, at 329; STIGLER, Op. Ci. supra
note 71, at 170. This permits the seller to entrench his position at home, which is already
monopolistic. See note 246 supra. And that will further intensify the effect upon outlying
markets. Cf. the Spark Plug cases, supra note 252. It will seriously impede entry in
either market. See ibid.; note 276 infra.
254. BURNS, op. cit. supra note 173, at 273; MACHLUP, THE EcoNomtucs oF SELLEs'S
COmaIPETImON 543 (1952) ; STIGLER, op. cit. supra note 71, at 216-17. So long as the markets
are separated, the seller can slash prices in the local market without fear of repercussions
in the other. See note 249 supra. So long as his home profit is secure, whatever he realizes
from the new market above the out-of-pocket expenses he incurs is an added profit to him.
See Clemens, Price Discrimination in Decreasing Cost Industries, 31 Am. EcoN. REv.
794 (Supp. 1941).
255. See BuRNs, op. cit. supra note 173, at 329; BouLDiNG, op. cit. supra note 249, at
463-67; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 215, at 420; Adelman, Integration and Public Policy,
63 HARv. L. Rav. 27, 39 (1949). In actual markets, where products are differentiated and
advertised, and a seller cannot sell as much as he can produce at a given market price
that is the same for all sellers, firms inevitably maximize their profits by producing below
the point of most efficient (capacity) output. See BouLDING, op. cit. supra, at 577; CHAM-
BERLIN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 88.
256. "Discrimination is practiced because it increases the amount of the product over
which the overhead is spread; that is, the fixed expenses have already been incurred, and
it costs only the additional variable cost to obtain the additional product. Since the incre-
ment to output is thus procured at less than its total cost ... it can be sold at less than
its total cost, and yet add to profits." Adelman, supra note 255, at 40; CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 215, at 416.
257. The regional seller will try to price his product as closely as possible to his com-
petitors' prices. See BOULDING, op. cit. supra note 249, at 574-75 (theory of "minimum
differentiation"). Because he can afford to work on any excess over marginal costs in
the local market, see notes 254-56 supra and accompanying text, he can sell at a lower
price than if he had to figure his profits on the basis of average costs. See note 258 infra.
258. So long as his price exceeds his marginal costs by the same amount in each
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sidized" because buyers in the home market are paying more than their share
of the fixed costs.2 9 The price may be further subsidized because the regional
seller can "average out" lower profits in the outlying market with higher
profits he is able to maintain in a less competitive home market :260 any extra
profit he can make without spoiling his home market is welcome.
26'
The local seller is put at a substantial disadvantage. When a regional seller
enters his market with an advertised product and competes for his customers,
the local seller must lower his price or lose customers.2 62 This may temporarily
increase competition in the local market.263 But it is the low price alone that
increases competition.2 64 No one objects to the low price alone; it is the dis-
criminatory combination of a low subsidized price in the local market tied
to a higher price in the monopolistic home market that is objectionable.265 For
when a local seller lowers his price he must lower his profit margin; he cannot
make it up elsewhere. This puts the local seller in the same position as a
small buyer trying to compete with a larger firm that is able to coerce a dis-
criminatory discount from a common supplier.2 66 He cannot compete on equal
market, his profits are the same. See BURNS, op. cit. supra note 173, at 329; CHAMBERLIN,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 76-78.
259. See notes 254-56 supra and accompanying text. In the secondary-line it is illegal
to charge some customers lower prices based upon the marginal cost of selling to them
rather than the average cost of selling to all customers. See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1936); statement of
Congressman Utterback, SO CONG. RE. 9417 (1936) ; PATMAN, op. cit. supra note 215,
at 19-20. This should hold true with respect to the primary-line as well.
260. It is clear that a seller seldom "recoups" local losses by raising prices elsewhere;
he is probably charging all he can get to start with. See Rowe, supra note 201, at 937.
But see statement of Senator Logan, 80 CONG. REc. 3113 (1936). However, so long as his
profits are secure in the home market, he "can afford to enter his rival's territory and sell
an additional lot of goods there for less than he can afford to take as an average on his
whole output.... ." CLARK:, op. cit. supra note 215, at 420; see DIRLAm & KAHN, op. Cit. supra
note 3, at 208. Furthermore, he may be willing to forego immediate profits in anticipation
of future monopoly profits. See id. at 144-50; BOULDING, op. Cit. supra note 249, at 560-
61; Rowe, supra, at 937. This, apparently, was General Foods' motive. See note 229 supra.
261. The reason that the seller is willing to "average out" higher profits with lower,
see note 260 supra, is that in reality it is not an averaging at all. The profit in the new
local market may be at a lower rate than profits in the home market, but it is extra profit.
And, more important, if the seller is unable to sell more units in the home market with-
out lowering the price on all his units, the "average" is likely to be higher than if he sold
the extra units in the home market and had to sell all units at a lower price.
262. See note 257 supra.
263. The entry of a regional seller will, of course, make the local sellers compete
vigorously for the business in the market. See SIMoN, op. cit. supra note 239, at 302;
Rowe, supra note 201, at 937. But the gain usually is only temporary. See PATmAN, op.
cit. supra note 215, at 35.
264. See Note, 55 COLUm. L. REV. 106, 108 (1955).
265. See notes 254-61 supra and accompanying text. The economic advantages in-
herent in a discriminatory price structure stack all the cards in favor of the discriminating
seller. And territorial discriminations "have little value in developing new business. They
serve chiefly to determine which competitor shall secure the larger share of the existing
business." CLARK, op. cit. supra, note 215, at 425.
266. See Dnu.m & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 208-09.
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terms because of the combined effects of the economies of size and the imper-
fection of markets, and the use of discriminatory pricing as a lever.20 7 There
is every likelihood that competition between him and the regional seller will
be injured. Furthermore, competition may be injured between the regional
seller and his competitors in his home market.208
Imperfect competition is a fact of life; it cannot be avoided.2 69 Methods
which accentuate and entrench imperfect competition can be prevented. Con-
gress singled out several of these methods in the Clayton Act.2 7 0 One was
price discrimination.2 7' The potentiality of harm from price discrimination
was so great that Congress amended the Clayton Act to require not the Clay-
ton Act standard of probable injury to competition but the less demanding
Robinson-Patman standard of probable injury to competition with any person
granting or receiving the benefit of a discrimination.2 7 2 This change was
directed towards injury at the secondary-line, but it was not limited to it.27a
Whenever a sizable firm sells a nationally or regionally advertised product
at a discriminatorily low price in an outlying market in which it does a sizeable
volume of business, the FTC should find a prima facie likelihood of injury to
competition between that seller and his competitors in the local market. The
discrimination gives the regional firm too great an opportunity to use market
power to eliminate or cow rivals ;274 it puts local sellers at too great a disad-
vantage ;275 and it provides too economical a way to block entry in both mar-
kets.2 7 6 It is the policy of Robinson-Patman to prevent these abuses before




268. See note 253 supra. The natural tendency of a territorially discriminatory price
structure is to strengthen the monopolistic seller in his own home market. This will tend
to injure competition between him and his smaller competitors in that market. Legal
thought has apparently neglected this form of competitive injury, which might well make
the use of territorial discrimination illegal as such when used by a substantial seller.
269. See, e.g., DIRLAM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 147; Hale & Hale, Market
Imperfections: Rinforcenent of the Antitrust Laws in a Frction-Afflicted Economy, 102
U. PA. L. REV. 157, 159-68 (1953). Principal imperfections are consumer ignorance (aided
by advertising), immobility, space and time lag, inertia, differentiation and governmental
action. Ibid. Adelman, supra note 255, at 39.
270. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952). See Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 (1953) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 311-13 (1949) ; DIRLAxM & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 48.
271. 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
272. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952). See notes 206, 245 supra and ac-
companying text.
273. See note 215 supra.
274. See notes 254-61 supra and accompanying text; note 235 supra.
275. See notes 262-68 supra and accompanying text.
276. See Landon, Geographic Price Structures, 15 LAW & CONTE'P. PROB. 125, 126
(1950) ; Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 340-41 (1954) ; notes 253, 268 supra; cf. the Spark Phg cases,
Docket Nos. 3977. 5620, 5624, 3 CCH TRA Dz REG. REP. 11467 (FTC July 1953).
277. See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
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The regional or national seller should not be able to rebut the prima facie
case of competitive injury thus established unless he can prove that local
sellers actually had the competitive advantage.2 7 8 This would permit a
cautious seller to test the response to his products in different markets before
committing himself to a reduction across the boards.2 79 His burden of proof
would not be difficult. But it would prevent a seller from using discriminatory
pricing first to establish local leadership and then to raise his price. He would
have to raise his price well before he became one of the leaders if he also
intended to maintain his price in his home market. However, it is doubtful
whether even this defense should be available to sellers who have obtained
significant power in national or sizable regional markets.28 0  Their market
strength would establish them as threats to local sellers even before they be-
came established in the local market.2 8 1 If they wish -to expand they are
free to do so--at their regular prices. They are always free to lower that price
to compete.
28 2
ADDMINISTRATIVE "EXPERTISE" AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: THE ROLE
OF THE COURTS AND THE FTC
The "new" Commission has asserted that its "expertise" frees it from the per
se presumptions the Supreme Court established in Standard Stations. 28 3 More-
278. AusnN, op. cit. supra note 206, at 44.
279. "If a seller must by law lower all his prices or none, he will hesitate to lower
any." Rowe, supra note 201, at 956. It is not the purpose of Robinson-Patman to prevent
the lowering of prices; only to prevent the discriminatory lowering of some prices to some
customers when that makes competitive injury likely. And a lower price in a local market
which the seller is just entering, if it is maintained for only the limited period necessary
to test consumer response, is likely to have a "comparatively slight" effect on competition
with other sellers. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 209, 220 (1954).
280. "When a giant corporation expands in its own or adjacent markets, it can hardly
assert the equities of the small newcomer. . . ." Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Comn-
petition-The Impact of Standard Oil of California v. United States on the Standard of
Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 39 (1949).
281. MERGER REPORT 103; Adams. The "Rule of Reasonv": Workable Competition or
Workable Monopoly?, 63 YALE L.J. 348, 367 (1954) ; cf. DnmAm & KAHN, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 147.
282. Robinson-Patman has been criticized for promoting "soft" competition for smaller
firms by relieving them from the competitive strain of lowered competitive prices. See
Arr'v GE. Com.si. REP. 161-66; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts
to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REV. 1139, 1198 (1952) ; Simon, The
Phantasy of the Phrase "Injury to Competition," 15 LAW & CONEM=P. PROB. 258 (1950).
But it is not the low price that Robinson-Patman .proscribes: it is the tying of an unlowered
price in the home market with a lowered, subsidized price in the local market. See notes
264-65 supra and accompanying text. This permits the large firm to choose its areas of
competition: to "play its area pricing pattern like a piano." See General Foods Corp.,
Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TADE REG. REP. ff 25069, at p. 35217 (FTC April 1952) (Mead
dissenting). This is very "soft" competition for the discriminating seller, and for its
local competitors it is unfair competition. Ibid.
283. See notes 101-03 supra and accompanying text (Maico case).
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over, in its territorial price discrimination cases it has stated that it will not
follow Moss v. FTC, although Moss has been approved by the Supreme
Court.28 4 These assertions of independence compel a re-examination of the
function of the "expert" administrative tribunal in an effective antitrust en-
forcement scheme. This re-examination will center upon 1) whether there is
a real need for an administrative agency in the antitrust field 2) whether the
"new" FTC is filling that need 3) whether the Commission is diverging from
standards established by Congress and the Supreme Court 4) whether, and
to what extent, such divergence should be permitted, and 5) what curbs, if
any, should be imposed upon divergence.
Certainly, there is great need for an administrative agency to assist in
enforcing the antitrust laws. These laws are, in effect, a skeletal framework
of terms of art which gradually acquire detailed meaning through subsequent
decisions. 285 The essentially legislative nature of this process is well suited to
an administrative agency, which is more frankly responsive to political changes
than are the courts. Furthermore, the complexity of antitrust problems and
antitrust litigation call for a body of experts who, by devoting their full time
to the problems involved, can acquire a facility in the field that the judge is
ordinarily unable to acquire.
All in all, the "new" Commission seems to be fulfilling its quasi-legislative,
quasi-judicial functions. It has given expression to the business policies of
the current political administration. It has made progress towards securing
compliance with a minimum of litigation by trying to enlist the co-operation
of businessmen. 286 It has made excellent use of its investigative facilities to
increase its "expertise. ' '28 7 And it has put that "expertise" to work by adopt-
ing legal standards that turn upon market analysis.
It does appear, however, that the Commission has departed from antitrust
standards established by Congress and the Supreme Court. It has concluded
that its "expertise" permits and requires it to consider market evidence which
-it believes-the Supreme Court has -excluded under a per se rule.2 88 And in
its territorial discrimination cases it has adopted interpretations of the law
which are in conflict with the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act, as that
purpose is revealed by legislative history and Supreme Court decisions. 2 9
These types of departures must be distinguished. The problem raised by
FTC insistence upon more complete factual analysis is different from the prob-
284. The Supreme Court approved Moss v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945), in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 n.13 (1948). But the
FTC noted that Moss was criticized by many writers, and was contrary to congressional
intent. General Foods Corp., Docket No. 5675, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 25069, at pp.
35212-13 (June 1954). See note 217 supra.
285. For an excellent discussion of this process see FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S.
470, 486-87 (1952) (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson).
286. See notes 30-61 supra and accompanying text.
287. See note 13 supra.
288. See notes 99, 101-103 supra and accompanying text.
289. See notes 215-82 supra and accompanying text.
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lem raised by its adoption of conflicting statutory interpretations. Administra-
tive agencies have traditionally considered types of evidence inadmissible be-
fore the courts.2 0  Moreover, the FTC was created to evaluate complex
factual situations ;291 it should not refrain from doing so simply because judges
feel ill-suited to become embroiled in economic analysis. Fuller evaluation of
marketing data may justify different conclusions as to the probable effects
of competitive practices. Divergence should be permitted to the extent that
it results from a fuller evaluation of relevant marketing data. The same
divergence necessarily arises from court to court, varying with the acuity and
experience of the judge.
Although the FTC's "expertise" gives it greater leeway in applying the
law to the facts of particular cases, it should not give it license to apply a
standard of legality different from that established by the Supreme Court.
Dual enforcement of the antitrust laws by the courts and FTC should not
lead to the enforcement of different laws.292 Thus, the Commission should
not be allowed to give weight to evidence that the Court has held irrelevant
as a matter of statutory interpretation. It should be reversed whenever it
permits a respondent to rebut a case of competitive injury by introducing evi-
dence of "workable competition. 12 93 For although Standard Stations may
not have established the general per se rule the FTC thinks it did, it certainly
did hold that workable competition is no defense to the probable injury re-
quirement of the Clayton Act.294  Moreover, the amounts and types of ad-
mittedly relevant evidence that the Commission requires to establish a prima
facie case should not be permitted to become so disproportionate to the
amounts and types required by the courts and by the statutes that they con-
stitute, in effect, a different standard of legality. The requirement that a
merger or a territorial discrimination is not illegal unless it tends to injure
competition "in general" seems subject to attack on this ground.295
290. E.g., hearsay evidence is admissible before administrative tribunals. Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938), and cases there cited; cf. also note
232 supra (admissibility of market surveys).
291. See note 10 supra and authorities there cited.
292. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949); A7-r'y
GEM. Comm. REP. 148 n.77; cf. Note, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 561 (1955).
293. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text. The FTC bases its ability to
consider this evidence on its "expertise" and on the Supreme Court's statement in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 292, that the economic questions in that case were
"most ill-suited for ascertainment by the courts," id. at 310, even if "capable of adminis-
tration" by the FTC. Id. at 310 n.13.
However, the FTC took this statement out of context, for the Court went on to state
that one rule would be necessary for both courts and Commission. "Our interpretation of
the Act, therefore, should recognize that an appraisal of economic data which might be
practicable if only the latter were faced with the task may be quite otherwise for judges
unequipped for it either by experience or by the availability of skilled assistance." Ibid.
(Emphasis added.)
294. See note 99 supra.
295. See notes 146-200 supra (mergers), notes 215-82 supra (territorial discrimina-
tions) and accompanying text.
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The standards of legality employed in FTC decisions should be subject to
judicial review whether the Commission upholds or dismisses the complaint.
All "final" orders are subject to review whether they are "positive" or
"negative. '296 At present, however, there is no appeal from FTC orders dis-
missing complaints. 297 For when the FTC dismisses a complaint its counsel
cannot, and respondent will not, bring the exculpatory order to the courts.
And there is doubt whether anyone else has "standing" to appeal the order.298
Appellate review of future FTC negative orders may be possible without
further legislative action, however. The Supreme Court has shown a marked
tendency to by-pass "over-refined technique" in order to review administrative
orders and has instead emphasized pragmatic effects. 29 9 Thus, a competitor
of an acquitted respondent-especially a competitor who intervened in the FTC
proceedings 3°°-might acquire appellate "standing" by showing that the ad-
ministrative order would subject him to substantial commercial loss. He might
be held to be an "aggrieved person" even though, technically, he would be
unable to demonstrate the "legal injury" traditionally required for an appellate
"controversy."3 0' 1 He would be acting as a private attorney general, seeking
296. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001(d), 1009
(c) (1952). The "negative order" doctrine, denying the reviewability of administrative
orders dismissing complaints, or otherwise failing to change the status quo, was laid to
rest by the Supreme Court in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
297. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
298. The Administrative Procedure Act provides: "Any person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within
the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof." 60 STAT.
237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1952). However, there is some difficulty in determining
who is an "aggrieved" person within the meaning of the Act. The difficulty arises because
it is unclear to what extent the Act modifies the old legal doctrine that an injury to a
legally protected right must be shown in order to acquire appellate "standing." See DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIV LAW §§ 199-202 (1951); Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
700-01 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). Furthermore, appellate pro-
cedures must satisfy the requirement that there be a "case or controversy." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1. See DAvis, op. cit. supra, § 200; Associated Industries v. Ickes, supra, at 701.
299. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942),
the Supreme Court stated that the real test of standing to get review "is not to be found
in an over-refined technique, but in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened. . . ." It is dangerous to generalize from these cases, which are sui
generis, but they do reveal that the Court will not necessarily insist on a legally protected
right. It is quite possible to take these cases as granting standing to businessmen who
suffer substantial commercial injury from an agency action which has the pragmatic effect
of fixing their rights in relation to a respondent. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States,
211 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
300. See DAvis, op. cit. supra note 298, § 203; cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 60
STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1038 (1952). "Interested persons" may intervene in FTC
cases. See note 16 supra. Intervention as such, however, does not give rise to appellate
standing. See Perkins v. Lukens, 310 U.S. 113 (1940) ; Pittsburgh & W.Va. Ry. v. United
States, 281 U.S. 479 (1930).
301, See note 298 supra.
The competitor is not a party to the FTC action. See note 16 supra. He has no legal
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at his own cost to vindicate the public interest in a correct and uniform inter-
pretation of the antitrust laws.
302
CONCLUSION
It would be neither fair nor accurate to conclude only that the "new" FTC
has disregarded the will of Congress or the authority of the Supreme Court.
In pursuing legitimate administrative functions it has rendered some decisions
which are open to serious criticism. Its territorial price discrimination cases
seem clearly erroneous. Maico and Pillsbury contain ambiguities that seem
at odds with Congressional intent and judicial authority. However, these de-
cisions seem best regarded as dangers inherent in an essentially desirable change
in approach: a renewed emphasis on "expert" market analysis. So long as judi-
cial review is available to insure that future decisions do not fall out of line with
the substantive requirements of the law, the new directions of the new Federal
Trade Commission should carry it towards improved enforcement of the anti-
trust laws.
right to require the FTC to proceed against respondent. That proceeding is made solely
in the public interest. Ibid.
However, DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 298, at 715, states that it should be sufficient for
the purposes of "standing" that a businessman have a substantial interest in correcting
an alleged error in the administrative agency's determination; it should not be necessary
for him to show injury to a "legal" right. "Instead of holding that a person with no right
has standing to represent the public interest but not his own interest . . . the Supreme
Court should hold that a person who is adversely affected may for that reason have stand-
ing to represent his own interests, even though the public interest is the criterion for
judgment." Id. at 717.
302. Statutorily "aggrieved" persons are private litigants, but they have standing "as
representatives of the public interest." Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,
14 (1942); see FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
Deeming the competitor to be acting as a private attorney general would seem to satisfy
the constitutional requirement of an appellate "controversy." See note 298 supra. For,
Congress may "authorize one of its own officials, such as the Attorney General, to bring
a proceeding to prevent another official from acting in violation of his statutory powers....
Instead of designating the Attorney General . . . Congress can constitutionally enact a
statute conferring on any non-official person ... authority to bring [such] a suit ... even
if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so
to speak, private Attorney Generals." Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704
(2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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